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I. INTRODUCTION
Where do entrepreneurs turn for funding once their credit
cards are maxed out, friends and family are no longer taking their
calls, but it is still too early for venture capitalists to invest? They turn
to "angel" investors. Angel investors are wealthy individuals who
personally finance the same high-risk, high-growth start-ups as
venture capitalists but at an earlier stage.1 Well-known angels include
Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen, EDS founder H. Ross Perot, and
Dallas Mavericks' owner Mark Cuban. But the prototypical angel may
still be rich old Uncle Joe, the wealthy, distant relative or family
acquaintance. 2 Angels come in many forms, yet together they
constitute an essential source of entrepreneurial finance, providing
some $25 billion to new ventures each year. 3 Not only are angels
important for the amount they provide to new start-ups, but for when
they provide it-at a crucial stage in the start-up's growth that allows
entrepreneurs to build the financial bridge from friends-and-family
funding to venture capital.
Despite
their
importance,
angels
are
surprisingly
underappreciated in the popular press and academia, especially legal

1.
There is no technical definition of an angel investor (sometimes referred to as a "private
investor" or "informal venture capitalist"), although most descriptions of angels focus on two
characteristics: wealth and the investment of personal funds. First, an angel typically qualifies
as an "accredited investor" under the securities laws, which means she has over $1 million in net
worth, or income over $200,000 in each of the last two years (or $300,000 with spouse) and
reasonably expects to reach the same income level in the current year. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)
(2008). Second, an angel invests her own funds, as compared to venture capitalists and other
financial intermediaries, who invest the funds of others.
2.
Drawing the line between the "friends and family" and "angel" categories can sometimes
be difficult, as in the case of non-immediate family members like Uncle Joe. There is no precise
definition of an angel investor, see supra note 1, but non-immediate family members are often
counted in the angels category.
3.
See infra note 57 (discussing the estimated size of the angels market).
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academia. Venture capitalists are credited for Silicon Valley success
stories such as Google, Amazon.com, and Apple Computer. But each of
these companies first relied on angels and might never have attracted
venture capital without them. 4 By investing their own funds in startups with no operating history, angels take significant risks. Start-ups
benefit from angel risk-taking, but so do venture capitalists, who rely
on angel funding to help start-ups develop and use angel funding as a
mechanism for sorting among the countless new start-ups that later
seek venture capital. Without angels, the venture capital model could
not exist in its current form. Even more importantly, without angels
our entire innovation-based economy-which relies on start-ups'
success and has produced over 12.5 million jobs and up to eleven
percent of our gross domestic product in recent years-would be in
5
jeopardy.
One contribution of this Article is to reveal the importance of
angel investors in entrepreneurial finance. Once people realize how
important angels really are, they will want to know more about them.
Although this Article begins broadly, it quickly hones in on one of the
many interesting aspects of angels yet to be explored: the angel
investment contract. Angel investment contracts have escaped
academic attention, yet they present an extremely interesting study in
contract design that informs financial contracting theory in important
ways.
Start-up investments are rife with uncertainty, information
asymmetry, and potential agency costs in the form of potential
opportunism by entrepreneurs. Venture capitalists mitigate these
problems by using their leverage over cash-strapped entrepreneurs to
insist on comprehensive investment contracts. These contracts allow
venture capitalists to screen, monitor, and control their investments
through a combination of staged financing, preferred stock, board
seats, negative covenants, and specific exit rights. Angel investing as
it has long been practiced, on the other hand, is strikingly informal.
Despite investing at a time when levels of uncertainty, information
4.
See MARK VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBERT J. ROBINSON, ANGEL INVESTING: MATCHING
START-UP FUNDS WITH START-UP COMPANIES - THE GUIDE FOR ENTREPRENEURS, INDIVIDUAL
INVESTORS, AND VENTURE CAPITALISTS 5 (2000) ("Venture capitalists get all the press, but the

vast majority of entrepreneurial funds are actually funded by business angels, especially those
firms in their earliest stages.").
5.
Robert E. Grady, Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Education and the
Work Force, 2 (Mar. 11, 2004) (explaining that venture-backed firms employed over 12.5 million
people and in the year 2000 accounted for approximately 11% of the U.S. Gross Domestic
Product). The current president of the Kauffman Foundation, Carl Schramm, contends that in a
world of globalization and outsourcing, entrepreneurship is America's remaining comparative
advantage. See generally CARL J. SCHRAMM, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL IMPERATIVE (2006).
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asymmetry, and agency costs are even higher, "traditional" angels do
not extract any of the venture capitalists' common contract
protections. Angels' use of simple contracts appears to be a departure
from what financial contracting theory would predict and, as a result,
seems to be puzzling behavior. Indeed, the conventional wisdom is
that angels use simple contracts because they lack the sophistication
of venture capitalists.
This Article will show that the conventional wisdom is wrong;
angels' preference for simple contracts is quite rational from a
financial perspective. First, an angel's financial payoff comes from a
small number of start-ups that go on to attract venture capital and
then exit by an initial public offering ("IPO") or private sale. Although
venture capitalists recognize the importance of angels in
entrepreneurial finance, they are hesitant to invest in start-ups when
an overreaching angel's preferences must be "unwound" for the
venture capitalists to receive their standard preferences. Because
venture capitalists have many potential start-ups to choose from, they
may pass on those presenting complications. Therefore, overreaching
angels reduce their chances for a large upside by making follow-on
venture capital funding unlikely. The rational angel recognizes that
she is the first, but not the last, source of outside investment and acts
accordingly.
Second, angel investment contracts are financially rational
because angels' informal methods of screening and monitoring
entrepreneurs substitute for venture capitalists' formal, contractbased methods. Angels economize on screening through investments
that are highly local and relationship-driven; they economize on
monitoring through active participation in venture development.
Finally, the costly contracting literature supports the financial
rationality of angel contracts. It is simply not cost-effective to design,
write, monitor, and enforce detailed contracts when smaller dollar
amounts are invested and when the duration of the detailed bargains
will be short due to venture capital unwinding.
The venture capital story ends here. Venture capital is a purely
financial endeavor because venture capitalists must produce returns
for venture fund investors within a relatively short time frame.
Angels, however, are not bound by such constraints because they
invest personal funds, and therefore answer to no one for the
investment. The use of personal funds gives angels the flexibility to
invest for nonfinancial as well as financial reasons, and, in fact, many
angels do have personal reasons for investment. Most angels are
successful ex-entrepreneurs who miss the excitement of new venture
development or wish to give back to the entrepreneurial community
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through "for-profit philanthropy."6 These nonfinancial motivations for
angel investment also help to explain the use of informal contracts.
Demanding comprehensive, protective terms would signal a lack of
trust in entrepreneurs, and literature on the relationship between
contract and trust suggests that an entrepreneur who receives this
signal will be less likely to invite angel participation or receive the
altruistic message that the angel hopes to send.
The informal model of angel investing described thus far
comprises the bulk of angel investments, and the primary goal of this
Article is to explain that model. In addition, this Article recognizes
that a radical transformation in angel investing has begun. Angels
increasingly are abandoning informal operation in favor of
professional organization. Although angels are still investing personal
funds, greater numbers of them are screening and pooling their
investments through regional angel groups. Jeffrey Sohl, who has
studied angels for over a decade, estimates that up to thirty percent of
angel investments might now come from angel groups, 7 although other
sources suggest that angel group investments may in fact make up
less than two percent of all angel investments.8 Whatever the precise
figure, the trend toward the professionalization of angel investing is
interesting in a number of respects. Keeping with the focus of this
Article, I examine the effect of this trend on angel contract design and
find that angel group contracts closely resemble early-stage venture
capital contracts.
In light of the rationality of traditional angel contract design,
this shift to the venture capital model presents the second puzzle that
this Article attempts to solve: If traditional angels' use of simple
contracts is indeed rational, can angel groups' use of comprehensive
contracts also be rational? The answer to this second puzzle is also yes
for several reasons, all of which stem from the fact that angel groups
6.
See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
7.
Hannah Clark, Are Angel Investors Heaven-Sent?, FORBES, May 4, 2006, http://www.
forbes.com/entrepreneurs/2006/05/04/entrepreneurs-finance-angels cx_hc_0504angel.html.
8.
According to the Angel Capital Association ("ACA"), the professional alliance of angel
groups in the U.S. and Canada, there were approximately 114 angel groups that were full
members of the ACA in the U.S. in 2006. ACA data show an average total investment for each
angel group at $1.78 million for the year (including investments by individual angel group
members, which is the most common form of angel group investment practice). ACA Angel Group
Confidence Report, Mar. 27, 2007, available at http://southeastvc.blogs.com
southeast vc/files/angel group-confidence reportresults.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2008).
Multiplying that figure by the number of groups gives a total of $202.9 million invested by all
angel groups. The largest angel groups are all full members of the ACA, but even if we assumed
an equivalent amount of investment outside of ACA-member groups, the total is no more than
$406 million, or 1.6% of the total $25 billion angel market. See infra note 57 (discussing the total
size of the angel market). I thank Luis Villalobos for this observation.
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more closely resemble venture capitalists than traditional angels in a
number of important ways. First, an angel group's more professional
nature, higher investment amounts, and slightly later investments
(all resembling early-stage venture capitalists) allow its members to
be somewhat more aggressive than the traditional angel without fear
of venture capital unwinding. Second, the angel group's opportunities
for informal screening and monitoring are less than for traditional
angels due to the more arms-length relationship between angel groups
and entrepreneurs. This relational distance increases uncertainty,
information asymmetry, and agency costs that must then be mitigated
by contract. Third, the angel group's higher transaction costs are
justified by higher investment amounts and a longer duration for
angel preferences. Finally, from a nonfinancial perspective, angel
groups derive private benefits that are not hindered by the use of
detailed investment contracts.
This Article's explanations for the rationality of both
traditional angel contracts and angel group contracts fill important
gaps in both the entrepreneurial finance and financial contracting
literatures. They also inform contract/trust and costly contracting
theories. The remainder of the Article is organized as follows. Part II
examines the typical venture capital investment contract and reviews
its mechanisms for reducing extreme levels of uncertainty,
information asymmetry, and agency costs in start-up investments.
Part III reveals the unique nature of angel investing, which explains
what otherwise appears to be a puzzling, simple contract design on the
part of traditional angels. Part IV examines changes in angel contract
design corresponding to the recent professionalization of the field and
shows that it is rational for these contracts to include more
comprehensive terms. Part V concludes.

II. THE VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT MODEL
Venture capital has been the financial engine driving most
successful start-up companies over the past several decades. Venture
capital has had its greatest successes in internet investments in the
mid- to late-1990s, including the funding of Google in 1999 by leading
Silicon Valley firms Kleiner Perkins and Sequoia Capital, 9 and the
funding of Yahoo in 1995 by Sequoia Capital. 10 Household-name
companies Apple Computer, Genentech, Intel, and Microsoft are

9.
10.

Google Milestones, Google.com, http://www.google.com/corporatelhistory.html#1999.
Company History, Yahoo.com, http://docs.yahoo.com/info/misc/history.html.
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likewise the products of venture capital.1 1 It is almost axiomatic to
observe that a start-up's chances for success will increase if it can
attract venture capital. Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner attempted to
quantify the venture capital effect. They found that ninety percent of
start-ups that were unable to attract venture capital within the first
three years failed, while the failure rate dropped to thirty-three
percent for those that did attract venture capital. 12 In addition to
financial capital, venture capitalists provide crucial value-added
services. They use their networking skills to recruit professional
managerial talent, 13 and they can provide seasoned expertise for
decisionmaking, such as determining the most profitable exit
14
strategy.
Infusions of venture capital are coupled with investment
contracts that set forth the venture capitalists' rights and obligations
in the start-up.1 5 Like angel investment contracts, venture capital
investment contracts are necessarily incomplete, which gives rise to
problems of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs in
the form of potential opportunism by entrepreneurs. 1 6 Start-up
investments are particularly interesting to financial economists
because they present extreme forms of these problems.1 7 Start-ups
have little or no operating history or tangible assets with which to
11. PAULA. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 1 (2000).
12. PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE MONEY OF INVENTION: How VENTURE CAPITAL
CREATES NEW WEALTH 10-11 (2001).
13. Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture
Capital Contracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP 54, 58-59 (Michael J.
Whincop ed., 2001). Value-added services can be as important as financial capital. eBay, for
instance, was a profitable start-up that did not require outside funding. Yet it sought venture
capital, which was provided by Benchmark Partners, in recognition that a venture capitalist's
connections and expertise would be essential in securing a seasoned CEO and other executives.
RANDALL E. STROSS, EBoYs: THE TRUE STORY OF THE SIX TALL MEN WHO BACKED EBAY AND
OTHER BILLION-DOLLAR START-UPS 22 (2000).
14. See Joshua Lerner, Venture Capitalistsand the Decision to Go Public, 35 J. FIN. ECON.
293, 314 (1994) (observing that experienced venture capitalists appear better able to time IPOs
than their less experienced counterparts).
15. The investment contracts might include an amendment to the start-up's corporate
charter (to create and designate preferred stock), a stock purchase agreement, and an investor's
rights agreement.
16. See, e.g., Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to
Financial Contracting,59 AM. REV. ECON. STUD. 473, 479 (1992).
17. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture CapitalMarket: Lessons from the American
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2003) ("The special character of venture capital
contracting is shaped by the fact that investing in early stage, high technology companies
presents [uncertainty, information asymmetry, and opportunism] in extreme form."); George G.
Triantis, FinancialContract Design in the World of Venture Capital,68 U. CHI. L. REV. 305, 31112 (2001) (observing that financial contracting is more difficult in venture capital than in bank
lending).
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predict future performance, and scientific or technological novelty like
that found in the typical Silicon Valley start-up adds another layer of
uncertainty. 8 This uncertainty provides entrepreneurs with
significant informational advantages over venture capitalists and
increases agency costs by making it more difficult for venture
capitalists to sort between good and bad entrepreneurs and monitor
investments. 19
Although it is impossible for venture capitalists to eliminate
these problems, they mitigate them by syndicating their investments
with other venture capitalists and investing in a portfolio of startups. 20 Venture capitalists also use incentive-aligning compensation
arrangements with entrepreneurs, such as stock options and stock
grants that vest over time. 21 And, most pertinent to this Article,
venture capitalists mitigate unforeseeable problems by designing
comprehensive investment contracts that give venture capitalists far
more control than their percentage ownership warrants, which, under
the conventional wisdom, cash-strapped entrepreneurs are forced to
22
accept.
18. Gilson, supra note 17, at 1077.
19. While most academics have focused on the potential conflicts between venture
capitalists and entrepreneurs, there are other notable conflicts present in this setting. See Robert
P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital,Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54
UCLA L. REV. 37 (2006) (discussing conflicts between different venture capitalists investing in
the same start-up); Jeffrey N. Leavitt, Burned Angels: The Coming Wave of Minority Shareholder
Oppression Claims in Venture Capital Start-up Companies, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 223 (2005)
(discussing conflicts between angels and venture capitalists); Kate Litvak, Venture Capital
Limited PartnershipAgreements: UnderstandingCompensation Arrangements, (Columbia Law &
Econ. Research Paper No. 254, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=555626 (discussing conflicts between venture capitalists and venture fund
investors).
20. See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 11, at 134 (explaining that syndication "allows the
venture capital firm to diversify its portfolio, thereby reducing the exposure to any single
investment.... By syndicating investments, the venture capitalist can invest in more projects
and diversify away some of the firm-specific risk.").
21. See id. at 131; Klausner & Litvak, supra note 13, at 62-63.
22. Venture capitalists typically enjoy bargaining power over entrepreneurs, although
bargaining power can shift over competition to fund the most desirable start-ups or in times of
flush times for private equity, when more cash is available to spend. See STROSS, supra note 13,
at 25 (explaining that in competitions to fund the most attractive start-ups, the bargaining
power shifts in favor of the entrepreneur); William W. Bratton, Venture Capitalon the Downside:
PreferredStock and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 897-98 (2002) (reciting the "onceprevailing story about venture capital transactions [that] entrepreneurs so need venture capital
that they cede both a majority of stock and control of the boardroom," but calling the onceprevailing story "incomplete"); Theresa Sullivan Barger, How to Dance with Angels, CFO.com
(Apr.
30,
2007),
available
at
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/9097739/c_9098309?f
=home-todayinfinance (discussing that in the current market where large amounts of both
venture capital and angel finance are available, bargaining power shifts to start-ups to decide
whose funding to accept).
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The typical venture capital investment contract employs five
protective measures. First, the contract provides for the disbursement
of funds to the entrepreneur in stages. Staged financing reduces
uncertainty by delaying funding until the entrepreneur proves herself
23
by achieving performance milestones set by the venture capitalist.
Venture capitalists can cut their losses by refusing to fund
entrepreneurs who do not reach these milestones. Staging reduces
information asymmetry and agency costs by allowing venture
capitalists to more effectively screen their investments and spend less
time monitoring in between financings. Screening of potential
investments is facilitated through signaling. The theory is that good
entrepreneurs will signal their quality by agreeing to condition funds
upon entrepreneurial performance while bad entrepreneurs will not. 24
Venture capitalists also have less need to monitor entrepreneurs
because staging strongly aligns entrepreneurs' interests with venture
capitalists' interests. The entrepreneur who needs the next cash
infusion to survive has a strong performance incentive and is unlikely
to shirk or seek private benefits at the expense of the venture
capitalist, which reduces agency costs. 25 Indeed, for all of these
reasons, staged financing is thought to work so well that Gompers and
Lerner describe it as "the most potent control mechanism a venture
capitalist can employ. 2 6
Second, venture capitalists take convertible preferred stock in
exchange for their cash infusions, in contrast to the common stock
taken by entrepreneurs and friend-and-family investors. 27 The use of

23. See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strmberg, FinancialContracting Theory Meets the Real
World: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 304 (2003)
(discussing staged financing).
24. Gilson, supra note 17, at 1080. As Klausner and Litvak observe, however, this signal
only works if the entrepreneur can accurately gauge the value of his business. Klausner &
Litvak, supra note 13, at 56.
25. Gilson, supra note 17, at 1079; Darwin V. Neher, Staged Financing: An Agency
Perspective, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 255, 255-56 (1999) (observing that staged financing mitigates
the entrepreneur's holdup potential).
26. GoMPERS & LERNER, supra note 11, at 139; see also Klausner & Litvak, supra note 13,
at 56 ("Most important among these contract terms is the staged nature of venture capital
investment.").
27. Kaplan and Strdmberg's survey of 213 venture capital investments in 119 portfolio
companies during the late 1990s found that 95.8% of all rounds used convertible preferred stock,
with convertible preferred stock being the sole security in 79.8% of all rounds. Kaplan &
Strdmberg, supra note 23, at 284 tbl.i. 38.5% of the rounds used participating preferred stock,
which entitles the holder not only to its preferential return, but also to share in the proceeds of
the common stockholders on an as-if-converted basis. Id.
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preferred stock offers several advantages for venture capitalists. 28 For
starters, it provides downside protection: the preferred stock is paid
first in the event of a liquidation or sale of the start-up-a common
end result for new start-ups. 29 The liquidation preference also
facilitates entrepreneurial signaling on the theory that entrepreneurs
who are willing to grant a venture capitalist the first payout signal
their belief that the start-up will be worth more than the venture
capitalist's preference. 30 Preferred stock is also allowed a higher
valuation, and in turn common stock and stock options can receive a
lower valuation. The lower valuation provides tax advantages that can
31
be helpful to the entrepreneur in recruiting new employees.
The third and fourth common features of investment contracts
are intended to allocate decisionmaking control to venture capitalists,
which reduces the potential for opportunistic behavior by
entrepreneurs (who otherwise would have such opportunities due to
their majority ownership). 32 Venture capitalists secure board seats in
increasing numbers with each round of investment. 33 Control of the
board entitles a venture capitalist to significant control of the start-up
34
because of the board's broad authority under corporate law.
Although academics have found that venture capitalists control the
board (i.e., they have a majority of board seats) less often than is

28. On the other hand, preferred stock receives disfavored treatment in litigation. See
Bartlett, supra note 19, at 101-07 (discussing Delaware's narrow approach to construing
preferred stock rights).
29. A sale is commonly counted as a liquidating event for purposes of triggering the venture
capitalist's preference. Preferred stock also carries a dividend preference, but since start-ups
rarely pay dividends during their life, the dividend preference is only valuable if it is cumulative,
thereby entitling the venture capitalist to a greater payout upon liquidation or sale. Klausner &
Litvak, supra note 13, at 64.
30. Id.
31. See Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A
Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 893-901 (2003)
(suggesting that preferred stock can be used to transform current ordinary income into deferred
capital gains, creating management incentives).
32. See William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital
Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 506-14 (1990) (explaining that venture capitalist control
rights minimize agency costs).
33. See D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital,53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 326
(2005) ("Because venture capitalists typically gain additional board seats with each round of
investment, over time the board composition provisions of venture-backed companies tend to
move from 'entrepreneur control' or 'contingent control' to 'investor control.' ").
34. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006) ("The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors ..
"); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 Nw. L. REV. 547 (2003) (arguing in favor of "director primacy").
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commonly assumed, 35 Jesse Fried and Mira Ganor contend that the
numbers are deceiving-that "independent" directors chosen by the
venture capitalist are likely to side with the venture capitalist in any
contested board vote, giving the venture capitalist effective control of
the board in more cases. 36 Another allocation of control comes from
negative covenants. Negative covenants require venture capitalist
approval for major decisions.37 These covenants are complementary
when venture capitalists control a board but are more important when
they do not. For instance, the venture capitalist probably has only a
minority of board seats after its first round of investment, but
prevent the entrepreneur from acting
covenants
negative
opportunistically during that time (e.g., by issuing additional
preferred stock that dilutes the venture capitalist's share).
Finally, investment contracts provide venture capitalists with
specific exit rights, which are important in private corporations with
illiquid shares. These exit rights include redemption (or put) rights,
demand registration rights, and conversion rights. 38 Agency costs may
be high when it comes to timing an exit because the preferences of
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs can differ. As a general rule,
venture capitalists require earlier exits due to the short life of venture
funds and the need to make distributions to fund investors, 39 while
entrepreneurs wish to delay exit in order to extend private benefits
such as a steady salary. 40 Redemption and other specific exit rights
address these potential conflicts by allocating the exit decision to
venture capitalists. Again, these rights are complementary when the

35. See Kaplan & Strdmberg, supra note 23, at 289-90 (documenting that venture
capitalists control start-up boards only 25% of the time, with contingent or shared control in
62% of the cases); see also Bratton, supra note 22, at 891-98 (using the Kaplan and Stromberg
findings to theorize that the parties prefer shared control to effectuate low-cost transfers of
control).
36. Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 988-89 (2006).
37. Gordon Smith's recent empirical study found that the vast majority of venture capital
investment contracts contained negative covenants against engaging in business combinations
(81.47%), amending the charter in ways adverse to the venture capitalist (91.01%), redeeming or
paying dividends to the common stock (70.84%), and issuing more preferred stock (80.38%)
without the venture capitalist's approval. Smith, supra note 33, at 346.
38. Id. at 348-55.
39. See infra note 164 and accompanying text. The push for an early exit may be even more
pronounced with inexperienced venture firms looking to "grandstand" to establish a reputation.
See generally Paul A. Gompers, Grandstandingin the Venture CapitalIndustry, 42 J. FIN. ECON.
133 (1996).
40. See Klausner & Litvak, supra note 13, at 57 (identifying an entrepreneur's private
benefits from delaying exit as "salary and other compensation, social status, and psychic benefits
of managing a business").
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venture capitalists already control the exit decision through board
41
control but are more important when they do not.

III. THE ANGEL INVESTMENT MODEL: A DEPARTURE FROM FINANCIAL
CONTRACTING THEORY?

A. The Need for Angels
Venture capital is crucial to a start-up's success, but it is not
immediately available to most start-ups. Most venture capitalists fund
start-ups that have survived their earliest stages and are expanding,
for instance by delivering products and services to customers, or are
preparing for an IPO or private sale. 42 Nor is venture capital readily
available in the smaller amounts that might be appropriate for very
young companies. 43 A typical venture round averages between $2
million and $10 million, although it can be much higher. 44 Therefore,
venture capitalists leave a critical funding gap that has both time and
capital components. The time gap is present during the earliest stage
of a start-up's life, which commonly lasts at least one year. 4 5 The

41. It also should be noted that the venture capital investment contract may reduce
uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs in the form of opportunism by
entrepreneurs, but in doing so it may allow opportunism by venture capitalists. Whether
reputational constraints can serve as an adequate deterrent to a venture capitalist's
opportunistic temptations is the subject of debate. See infra notes 150-53 and accompanying
text.
42. For commonly used staging terminology, see Jeffrey Sohl, The Early Stage Equity
Market in the USA, 1 VENTURE CAPITAL 101, 106 (1999).
43. See Joshua Lerner, 'Angel" Financingand Public Policy: An Overview, 22 J. BANKING &
FIN. 773, 778 (1998); Hans Severiens, The Band of Angels: The Origins of Collaboration, in
STATE OF THE ART: AN EXECUTIVE BRIEFING ON CUTTING-EDGE PRACTICES IN AMERICAN ANGEL
INVESTING 18, 21 (John May & Elizabeth F. O'Halloran eds., 2003) [hereinafter STATE OF THE
ART] (observing that "while some hot companies could absorb these larger sums [provided by
venture capitalists], the average unproven start-ups that needed $1 million to build a prototype
and hire a couple of people were left out of consideration").
44. See Sohl, supra note 42, at 109 (observing that the "handoff" from angel investors to
venture capitalists typically occurs in the $2-3 million range). The recent litigation between
venture capitalist Benchmark Partners and start-up Juniper Financial reveals an instance of
more substantial venture capital investment. Juniper received a first venture round of $20
million, a second round of $95.5 million, and a third round of $145 million. Benchmark Capital
Partners IV, L.P. v. Vauge, No. Civ. A. 19719, 2002 WL 1732423, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 15, 2002),
aff'd sub. nom. Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Juniper Fin. Corp., 822 A.2d 396 (Del.
2003).
45. Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital,
50 J. FIN. 1461, 1473 (1995) (noting that most venture capitalist investments are made after the
first year).
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capital gap exists for funding in amounts less than $2 million. Of
course, friends, family, and the entrepreneur's own efforts may
provide some funding (up to $100,000 or so), but this is hardly enough
46
to sustain the rapid-growth start-up for very long.
Venture capitalists do not fill the funding gaps as to time or
capital for several reasons. 47 First, because risk and uncertainty
decrease as a start-up grows, venture capitalists sit out the early
stages in favor of later ones. Second, venture funds attract large
amounts of capital from fund investors, and spending this capital
efficiently requires making large investments that may not be
appropriate for very young companies. Finally, venture capitalists
screen and monitor their investments closely, which imposes
significant costs. 48 For instance, a partner from the venture capital
49
firm typically sits on the board of each start-up that the firm funds.
This intensive use of human resources limits the number of start-ups
that can be funded. The need for selectivity exacerbates the tendency
to fund only start-ups with some operating history and supply them
with large investments.
The funding gap poses a serious problem for start-ups. Without
financial and nonfinancial assistance during their first year, many

46. See Jeffrey E. Sohl, The U.S. Angel and Venture Capital Market: Recent Trends and
Developments, 6 J. PRIVATE EQUITY 7, 14 (2003) ("The [capital] gap ranges from $100,000 at the
low end, the point at which the money raised from friends and families and bootstrapping runs
out, to the $2 million range on the high end, the time when the venture would historically
become attractive enough to catch the eye of venture fund investors.").
47. There are exceptions, such as specific venture funds devoted to early stage investments,
but early stage investments are not the industry norm. To underscore this observation, Van
Osnabrugge and Robinson found that in 1998, during the height of the dot.com era when venture
capitalists were said to move into earlier stage investments, still only 28% of all venture capital
was invested in early stage deals. VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supranote 4, at 49.
48. On the decision to invest, Gompers and Lerner write:
The typical venture organization receives many dozens of business plans for
each one it funds. Although most proposals are swiftly discarded, serious
candidates are extensively scrutinized through both formal studies of
technology and market strategy and informal assessment of the management
team. (It is not unusual for a venture team to complete 100 or more reference
checks before deciding to invest in a firm.)
GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 11, at 5; see also John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the
Angel Finance Market: A Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private
Capital Raising Setting, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861, 873-74 (2005) (explaining that it is more costeffective to spread sizeable due diligence costs over a larger investment). On monitoring, see
GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 11, at 171 ('Venture capitalists' oversight of new firms involves
substantial costs."); John Freear et al., Angels on Angels: Financing Technology-Based Ventures A HistoricalPerspective, 4 VENTURE CAPITAL 275, 278 (2002).
49. GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 11, at 171-84 (discussing how venture capital board
membership varies with geographic proximity to the start-up and during times where greater
oversight is needed).
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start-ups fail to develop to the point of attractiveness for venture
capitalists. 50 This early point is where angels are so critical. Angels fill
the funding gap as to both time and capital, functioning as a "conveyor
51
belt" that moves young start-ups toward waiting venture capitalists.
First, angels fill the time gap by investing when venture
capitalists will not. Jeffrey Sohl estimates that angels provide eighty
percent of the early-stage capital to high-tech start-ups. 52 Andrew
Wong's empirical study of angel investment found that, when angels
invested in early rounds, seventy-three percent of the time they did so
without venture capitalists as co-investors. 53 With venture capitalists
moving toward even later-stage investments than before, the need for
angels in the early rounds is even more pronounced. 54 Because they
direct their investments at start-ups in different stages of
development,
angels and venture capitalists mostly serve
than competitive functions. 55
rather
complementary
Second, angels fill the capital gap by providing appropriate
amounts of funding to early-stage start-ups. A typical angel round
ranges from $100,000 to $1 million or even $2 million at the high
end-the very size of the capital gap. 56 This financing allows earlystage companies to accomplish a variety of objectives that will make

50. Sohl, supra note 46, at 15 (observing that "without seed and start-up capital, many of
these high-tech ventures do not even get past the initial stages of development").
51. See Tony Stanco & Uto Akah, The Relationship Between Angels and Venture Capitalists
in the Venture Industry, LAB2IPO, 2005, at 6, http://lab2ipo.org/A2VCSurveyVC%20Angel
%20Survey%20v.final.pdf (using the conveyor belt analogy).
52. Sohl, supra note 46.
53. Andrew Wong, Angel Finance: The Other Venture Capital at 12 & 43 tbl.2 (Working
Paper Series 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=941228; id. at 11 ('Most firms that
receive [angel] funding are less than 12 months old. In comparison, the average age of first
funding for venture-backed firms is greater than one year.") (citation omitted).
54. See infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
55. See John Freear & Jeffrey Sohl, The Characteristicsand Value-Added Contributionsof
Private Investors to EntrepreneurialSoftware Ventures, 6 J. ENTREPRENEURIAL FIN. 84, 89 (2001)
(asserting that "the research [on the funding of software ventures] provides added evidence to
support the existence of a complementary relationship between private investors and venture
capital funds"); cf. Brent Goldfarb et al., Does Angel ParticipationMatter? An Analysis of Early
Venture Financing 27 (Working Paper Series 2008), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=1024186 (arguing that in those "Series A" financing rounds where angels and venture
capitalists compete to fund, entrepreneurs will prefer angels for reasons suggested in this
Article, creating an adverse selection or "lemons" problem for venture capitalists).
56. Sohl, supra note 46, at 13 ('The typical angel deal is an early-stage round (seed or startup) in the $100,000 to $2 million range."); Wong, supra note 53 (noting that angel rounds
averaged $1 million). Some accounts from the early to mid-1990s suggest that the transition
from angel to venture capital financing occurred sooner, around $500,000 to $1 million. John
Freear et al., The Private Investor Market for Venture Capital, 1 FINANCIER 7, 8 (1994); John
Freear & William E. Wetzel, Jr., Who Bankrolls High-Tech Entrepreneurs?,5 J. BUS. VENTURING
77, 87 (1990).
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them attractive to venture capitalists including marketing, securing
customers, and obtaining patent protection. The aggregate angel
capital market is estimated to be as large as, or even larger than, the
venture capital market. 57 But because each angel round is smaller,
angels fund significantly more start-ups than venture capitalistsperhaps thirty to forty times more.5 8 Therefore, while angels provide a
filtering function for venture capitalists, they do not use too fine a
filter, which reduces the chance that a promising start-up will fail
prematurely.
Finally, angels provide value-added services to entrepreneurs.
These are nonfinancial services of a different type than venture
capitalists provide. While venture capitalists take a more formal role
and offer benefits such as connections to professional managers,
angels provide informal advice and counseling. Most angels are exentrepreneurs themselves, which allows them to offer seasoned advice
on and empathy with the many difficulties faced in advancing an
early-stage venture. 59 Angels typically invest in companies that are a
short drive away to facilitate regular interactions with entrepreneurs
and active participation in the venture's growth. 60 Many
entrepreneurs believe that an angel's advice is as important as her
61
financial capital.
For all of these reasons, not only do angels help start-ups grow,
but they also allow the venture capital model to work in its present

57. Although it is difficult to estimate the total size of the angel market due to its
informality, studies suggest that during modern times it has ranged from an average of about
$25 billion per year to a peak of $50-$60 billion during the height of the dot.com era in 2000. See
VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 69; Freear et al., supra note 56, at 7. The
venture capital market also rose sharply during the dot.com era. Venture capitalists invested
$3.8 billion in start-ups in 1995, followed by $10 billion in 1997, $35.6 billion in 1999, and over
$100 billion in 2000. See Sohl, supra note 46, at 13. The years since the dot.com bust have seen a
return to average venture capital investments of around $20 billion per year. ANDREW METRICK,
VENTURE CAPITAL AND THE FINANCE OF INNOVATION 13 (2007). In 2006, angels and venture

capitalists each invested approximately $25 billion. See CENTER FOR VENTURE RESEARCH, THE
ANGEL INVESTOR MARKET IN 2006: THE ANGEL MARKET CONTINUES STEADY GROWTH, (2006)

available at http://unhinfo.unh.edu/news/docs/
2006angelmarketanalysis.pdf (citing total angel investments in 2006 at $25.6 billion).
58. VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 69.
59. Id. at 108 (stating that 75-83% of angels have prior start-up experience); see John
Freear et al., Angels and Non-Angels: Are There Differences?, 9 J. BUS. VENTURING 109, 111
(1994) (citing studies for the proposition that a majority of angels "have entrepreneurial
experience as owners or managers").
60. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
61. See Freear & Wetzel, supra note 56, at 96-97 (discussing that 70% of entrepreneurs
considered the value-added services of angels to be very or moderately productive); Sohl, supra
note 42, at 112 (explaining that entrepreneurs described the mentoring they received from
angels "to be as valuable as the capital").
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form. The venture capital model relies on start-ups surviving their
earliest stages; this survival requires angels. Without angels, venture
capitalists would have to invest earlier and more often-earlier so
start-ups would have the cash necessary for initial growth and more
often because angels would not have provided an early-stage sorting or
filtering function among the countless start-ups that seek funding.
Although the need for angels is clear from a theoretical
perspective, the histories of leading companies such as Amazon.com
and Google firmly illustrate the point as a practical matter.
Amazon.com founder Jeff Bezos approached venture capitalists early
on, but he was told that his company was not ready for venture funds.
Instead, a dozen angels were willing to invest $1.2 million, which was
crucial in positioning the company for its later $8 million venture
round. 62 Google similarly benefited from an early $100,000 investment
from angel Andy Bechtolsheim, one of the founders of Sun
Microsystems. This cash infusion allowed Google co-founders Larry
Page and Sergey Brin to "move out of their dorm rooms and into the
63
marketplace."
B. TraditionalAngel Investment Contracts
Like venture capitalists, angels enter into investment contracts
with entrepreneurs. For the reasons discussed earlier, extreme levels
of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs in the form
of potential entrepreneurial opportunism also plague angel
investments.6 4 In fact, because angels invest at an earlier stage than
venture capitalists, when a start-up has no operating history
whatsoever, these problems are even more acute than at the time
venture capitalists invest. Therefore, financial contracting theory
would seem to predict an angel contract modeled after the venture
capital contract, perhaps with even more protections, including the
use of a convertible, preferred security and significant control rights.6 5
62. Sohl, supra note 42, at 102.
63. Michael V. Copeland, How to Find Your Angel Investor, BUS. 2.0 MAG., Feb. 28, 2006,
http://money.cnn.com/2006/02/28/magazines/business2/angelinvestor/
index.htm; see also Google Milestones, Google.com, http://www.google.com/corporate/
history.html#1998.
64. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
65. See Dirk Bergemann & Ulrich Hege, Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard, and
Learning, 22 J. BANKING & FIN. 703, 703-11 (1998) (discussing the optimal shares for the
entrepreneur and the venture capitalist in the context of common stock, debt, and convertible
securities); Francesca Cornelli & Oved Yosha, Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Debt,
(Centre for Econ. Pol'y Res. Discussion Paper No. 1735, 1997), available at http://www.
cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?dpno=1735; Neher, supra note 25; Jeffrey J. Trester, Venture
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Yet what we know reveals that the investment contracts used by
traditional angels differ dramatically from those used by venture
capitalists because they provide far less investor protection.
The research on angel contracts must be pieced together from
various sources because angels are very difficult to study. 66 The angels
market has long been reference-driven and informal-angels generate
67
deal flow from trusted referrals and operate behind the scenes.
Angels have a penchant for secrecy to avoid being inundated with
funding requests from the multitudes of new start-ups that require
capital. 68 That angels prefer to operate through back channels makes
69
finding them as difficult for academics as it is for entrepreneurs.
Therefore, there are few studies of angel contract design.7 0
Andrew Wong offers the best study of angel contract design to
date.7 1 Wong's sample consists of 215 angel investment rounds in 143
companies from across the United States during the period from 1994
to 2001.72 Although they are few in number, Wong's study, other
Capital Contracting Under Asymmetric Information, 22 J. BANKING & FIN. 675, 675-80 (1998)
(considering the preferred versus debt choice under asymmetric information).
66. See Wong, supra note 53, at 2 ("Despite the importance of angel funding, much of what
is known about angels is incomplete and not well understood. Very few academic studies have
examined angels, in part because data on angel investment is difficult to obtain.").
67. VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 144 (noting that "studies have found
that business angels usually learn of investment opportunities through a network of friends and
family, business associates, accountants, and lawyers as referrals"); MIT ENTREPRENEURSHIP
CENTER,
VENTURE
SUPPORT
SYSTEMS
PROJECT:
ANGEL
INVESTORS
28
(2000),
http://entrepreneurship.mit.edu/Downloads/AngelReport.pdf [hereinafter MIT Study] ("The
angels we interviewed said they received their highest quality deals from their network of
trusted business associates."). In what is credited as the earliest article on angels, William
Wetzel observed that the angels market is "virtually invisible, inefficient, and often
misunderstood." William E. Wetzel, Jr., Angels and Informal Risk Capital, SLOAN MGMT. REV.
23, 24 (1983).
68. VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 46 ("If it becomes widely known that an
individual has money to invest, then he or she may be besieged with hundreds of proposals per
year, when his or her desire may be only for three or four.").
69. Id. at 84 (noting that in their attempts to interview angels, angels were often asked for
an extensive explanation as to how they were found, with a number refusing to answer).
70. See Jeffrey E. Sohl, The Private Equity Market in the USA, 5 VENTURE CAPITAL 29, 42
(2003) (explaining that research on the "terms and conditions" of angel investment contracts is
"acutely missing from the current knowledge base"). On the types of studies that comprise the
existing literature on angels, see Freear et al., supra note 48, at 279 ("The majority of the
research output ... has been empirically based, seeking to learn more about the attitudes,
behaviour and characteristics of the angel population (often known as the 'ABCs' of angels).");
Wong, supra note 53, at 8 (asserting that while most studies of angels "focus mainly on
descriptive statistics of investment size [his] paper focuses on the control aspects of angel
investment"). Much of what we currently know about angels comes from the University of New
Hampshire's Center for Venture Research and its affiliated academics, including John Freear,
Jeffrey Sohl, and William Wetzel. The Center's website address is http://wsbe.unh.edu/cvr/.
71. See generally Wong, supranote 53.
72. Id. at 4.
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studies, 73 and anecdotal accounts present a fairly consistent picture of
angel contract design. They reveal that traditional angels use simpler
contracts that are comprised of more entrepreneur-friendly terms than
do venture capitalists. 74 As a general rule, these contracts employ
none of the five methods venture capitalists have devised to mitigate
uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs in start-up
investments.
First, traditional angels do not stage their investments. Wong's
survey found that when a venture capital round followed an angel
round, angels were unlikely to participate. 75 Even when some angels
did participate in future rounds, Wong found that it was less than half
of the initial investors.7 6 These findings track the conventional wisdom
that angels provide early-stage funding to grow the start-up for the
first year or so, after which venture capitalists take over. When an
angel does follow on her own investment in a later round, she usually
sees a lower return, 77 suggesting that the angel provided the
subsequent funding as a last resort to keep a struggling venture afloat
rather than to obtain a larger piece of a good investment.
Second, the traditional angel receives common instead of
preferred stock in exchange for her investment. Wong's survey found
that the greatest number of angels took straight common stock, 78
which tracks anecdotal accounts. For example, Stephen Prowse states
that, "unlike in the organized private equity market, many angels are
content to take common stock, ' 79 and Jesse Fried and Mira Ganor
80
observe that "angels frequently invest through common equity."

73. For example, Stephen Prowse offers a small study of Dallas-area angels. Stephen
Prowse, Angel Investors and the Market for Angel Investments, 22 J. BANKING & FIN. 785 (1998).
74. VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 175 ("Angels often use relatively simple
investment contracts."); Sohl, supra note 42, at 112 (noting that angel "[d]eal structure, as stated
in their terms and conditions, tend to be briefer and more informal than those of venture capital
funds"); MIT Study, supra note 67, at 36 (explaining that angels who invest in a small number of
deals, are new to angel investing, or who invest primarily for nonfinancial reasons "use informal
or simple term sheets, or in some cases, there is no term sheet").
75. Wong, supra note 53, at 18 (observing that "staging is not a frequently used control
mechanism by angels").
76. Id.
77. Robert Wiltbank & Warren Boeker, Returns to Angel Investors in Groups 8 (Working
Paper Series, 2007), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1028592; see also Bob Goff, The SierraAngels: Broadeningthe Charter,in STATE OF THE ART 70,
supra note 43, at 83 (asserting that during tough times, angels "must be prepared to help fund
subsequent rounds for portfolio companies").
78. Wong, supra note 53, at 19 ("Common equity is the most prevalent security, used in 34%
of all [early stage] rounds and 39.5% of angel-only rounds.").
79. Prowse, supra note 73, at 790.
80. Fried & Ganor, supra note 36, at 1009.
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Third, while board seats are commonly granted in venture
capital rounds, they do not appear common in angel rounds. Wong's
study found that less than half of all angel rounds involved granting
the investor even a single board seat.8 1 Another study of angel
investments in software ventures suggested the figure is even lower,
at only twenty percent.8 2 On the other hand, one older study and some
anecdotal accounts suggest that, in angel investments, board
representation is more common than other venture capital protective
83
devices.
Fourth, few angels contract for negative covenants. Wong's
study found that negative covenants allowing investors to veto
management decisions were included in only 5.1 percent of angel
contracts.8 4 In a study of Dallas-area angels, Stephen Prowse observed
that "control mechanisms used in the organized private equity
market, such as covenants preventing mergers, asset sales or entering
into long-term contracts without outside investor approval, appear
85
rare in the angel market."
Finally, like negative covenants, specific exit rights also may be
used less frequently by angels than other venture capital protective
devices. Wong's study found that a provision granting angels the right
to force bankruptcy was included in only 4.6 percent of angel
contracts.8 6 This tracks the observation by Van Osnabrugge and
Robinson that angels are unlikely to specify a method of liquidation at
the time of investment.8 7 Wong's study also revealed no contracts
where the angel was allowed to put her shares to the entrepreneur for

81. Wong, supra note 53, at 15 (discussing the fact that a board seat is granted in only
42.5% of angel rounds).
82. See Freear & Sohl, supra note 55, at 96 (observing that only 20% of angels funding
software ventures had representation on the board).
83. See John Freer et al., Raising Venture Capital:Entrepreneurs'View of the Process, 1990
FRONTIERS ENTREPRENEURSHIP RES. 223-37 (reporting that 71% of angels were on boards);
Prowse, supra note 73, at 790 ("Angels are very often on the board."); Jeffrey E. Sohl & Jill
Areson-Perkins, Current Trends in the Private Equity Financing of High Tech Ventures: An
Analysis of Deal Structure 5 (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Vanderbilt Law
Review) (noting that "for venture capitalists, as well as angels, board representation is an
important consideration"). But see Fried & Ganor, supra note 36, at 1009 ("Unlike VCs, angels
generally do not acquire control rights and board positions.").
84. Wong, supra note 53, at 53 tbl.6 panel D.
85. Prowse, supranote 73, at 790.
86. Wong, supra note 53, at 53 tbl.6 panel D.
87. VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 199 ("Freear, Sohl, and Wetzel's
finding that in the United States 'private individuals were more inclined to leave the method of
liquidation undefined at the time of investment than were venture capital funds' still rings
true.") (citation omitted).
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redemption, but thirty-eight contracts allowed the entrepreneur to
exercise a call option and redeem the angel's shares.88
Traditional angels do, however, use at least one of the venture
capitalists' noncontractual, risk-spreading devices: syndication of
investments. Angels have long syndicated their investments with
angel investment teams comprised of anywhere from six to twelve
"active" and "passive" angels.8 9 It is difficult to tell to what
extent
angels adopt the venture capitalist's portfolio theory of investment,
however. Some studies and anecdotal accounts suggest that the
typical angel invests in less than one deal per year, which would not
permit much diversification, 90 while other commentators have
suggested that angels do diversify. 9 1 More empirical work is needed to
answer this question. However, even if angels invest in a number of
start-ups, their preference for start-ups in their field of expertise
limits the diversification of industry. 92
Again, angels are very difficult to study, and the survey
method most commonly used to study them has inherent flaws. 93 As
two commentators wrote: "Angel research is a crude field in an early
stage of development where convenience sampling is often a necessity
and statistically valid generalization is nearly always impossible. '94

88. Wong, supra note 53, at 53 tbl.6 panel D. Unsurprisingly, I have not come across
evidence of a traditional angel bargaining for registration rights.
89. Sohl, supra note 42, at 111 ("In many cases there is a lead investor that brings the
investment opportunity to these co-investors as a means of risk sharing and pooling of capital to
round out the financing requirements."); Sohl, supra note 46, at 13 (explaining that a typical
angel round involves six to eight investors); Wong, supra note 53, at 23 ("On average, twelve
angels co-invest in a round."). Syndication can be less attractive to active angels who invest to
play a hands-on role in the entrepreneurial process if co-investors also wish to play that role. See
VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 136 (citing one angel as stating: "Co-investors
attract if I'm in it purely for the investment; if it's an investment where I have a hands-on role it
doesn't attract - otherwise you have too many egos involved, and it leads to conflict."). Stephen
Prowse observes that passive angels rarely exist in a syndicate without an active angel. Prowse,
supra note 73, at 788.
90. See VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 109 (discussing studies by Freear
and Wetzel, J.D. Aram, and R.J. Gaston); Prowse, supra note 73, at 788 ('Many angels do not
make more than one investment per year, although there are a few full time angels that will
make four or more per year.").
91. Freear et al., supra note 48, at 277 ("Angels will tend to invest in entrepreneurial
ventures as part of a total portfolio that contains investments with differing risk
characteristics.").
92. See infra notes 127-32 and accompanying text (detailing how angels select their
investments).
93. Wong sought to reduce selection bias by sampling entrepreneurs that received angel
funding rather than angels themselves. Wong, supra note 53, at 8-9.
94. Kevin Hindle & Susan Rushworth, The Demography of Investor Heaven: International
Research on the Attitudes, Behaviour and Characteristicsof Business Angels, in BRIDGING THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP 10, 10 (Michael J. Whincop ed., 2001).
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Also, it is likely that differences among the individuals who fall into
the "traditional angel" category translate to differences in contract
design. For instance, more experienced and sophisticated angels in
high-tech corridors may demand more venture capital-like terms. 95 On
the other hand, obscenely wealthy angels may not ask for a contract at
all, or they may ask for only a simple contract because the investment
is not a meaningful sum of money for them. (This might have been the
case with Andy Bechtolsheim's $100,000 investment in Google, where
legend has it he simply handed the founders a check after they made a
short presentation.) Furthermore, repeat angels "burned" by a lack of
foresight in the past may contractually protect against risk in future
investments. The impact of these differences among traditional angels
has not been adequately considered, and it would be useful to conduct
further empirical studies that employ a more refined taxonomy.9 6 Still,
despite the exceptions to the general rules described above and the
need for further research and refinement, the available evidence does
point to a unique investment model for traditional angels as a
generalized group-a model that seems puzzling in its lack of
contractual protections for angel investors.
C. Explaining TraditionalAngel Investment Behavior
Why does the angel model differ so dramatically from the
venture capital model and from what financial contracting theory
would appear to predict given the risk inherent in start-up
investments? It could be, as has been suggested, that angels lack
bargaining power over entrepreneurs to extract the same contract

95. A 2000 MIT study of 26 experienced angels in the Silicon Valley and Route 128 areas
found larger investments and greater use of venture capital-like terms among these investors.
MIT Study, supra note 67, at 37; see also Peter Kelly & Michael Hay, The Private InvestorEntrepreneurContractualRelationship: Understandingthe Influence of Context, 2000 FRONTIERS
ENTREPRENEURSHIP RES. 258, 264 (observing that "we found that more experienced investors
incorporated more contractual safeguards up front than their less experienced colleagues");
Prowse, supra note 73, at 788 ("The more sophisticated angels tend to insist on investment
contracts that resemble the ones written in the organized private equity market, which contain
lots of mechanisms to overcome moral hazard problems and protect them in the case of poor
performance, whereas unsophisticated angels omit even the most basic protections.").
96. Broader taxonomies have been attempted, although none have matched the categories
of angels with contracting behavior. See VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 85-90
(providing some of the taxonomies of angels that have been suggested over the years, including
one taxonomy that includes ten types of traditional angels); MIT Study, supra note 67, at 17-2 1.
But see Freear et al., supra note 48, at 281 ("Perhaps fortunately, the spate of new terms [for
angels], once in full flood, is drying up.").
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protections as venture capitalists. 9v But this is unlikely considering
that start-ups need angel funding and value-added services to advance
beyond the initial stages of development. Accordingly, angels do, as a
general
rule, enjoy bargaining
power
over cash-strapped
entrepreneurs. It is also unlikely that a competitive market among
angels is driving contract design. First, there is excess demand for
98
angels and, therefore, plenty of funding opportunities to go around.
Second, if angels do compete to fund the most attractive start-ups,
then the competition is probably like that of venture capitalists-over
valuation and reputation rather than contract terms. 99
A second possible explanation for the angel model is that
angels do not need comprehensive contracts because they adequately
diversify risk by syndicating their investments and investing in a
portfolio of start-ups. In other words, they make efficient use of two of
the three venture capitalist protective measures, which renders the
third unnecessary. However, there are two problems with this
explanation: 1) venture capitalists still consider comprehensive
investment contracts necessary, despite their use of syndication and
portfolio theory; and, 2) as discussed in the last Section, it is far from
clear that angels invest in a sufficient number of start-ups or
industries to allow for true diversification. 10 0
A third possible explanation is that angels are unsophisticated
investors who are willing to settle for few protections because they do
not know any better. Indeed, this is probably the conventional wisdom
as to why angels invest as they do. 10 1 However, while a lack of
97. MIT Study, supra note 67, at 37 (observing that "even experienced angels do not achieve
all the stringent venture capitalist terms. They do not have the negotiating power of venture
capitalists .... ").
98. Despite a robust angel market, the funding gap still exists. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr.,
Relaxing the Ban: It's Time to Allow General Solicitation and Advertising in Exempt Offerings, 32
FLA. ST. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2004) (suggesting that the funding gap could be filled if the SEC allowed
general solicitation in exempt offerings); Sohl, supra note 46, at 14 (attributing the funding gap
to capital and information inefficiencies); Colleen DeBaise, On Angels' Wings, WALL ST. J., Mar.
19, 2007, at R6 (discussing proposed "Access to Capital for Entrepreneurs Act of 2006," which
would have provided a 25% tax credit for angel investing).
99. It could be that angels as a group maintain their dominance over funding early stage
start-ups by eschewing the venture capital model, but there is little evidence that venture
capitalists wish to move into this space, and good reasons why this is so. See supra notes 47-49
and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
101. See VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 172 (explaining that only 38% of
angels in the UK seek assistance from lawyers and accountants); Fried & Ganor, supra note 36,
at 1009 ("Because angels invest less than VCs and are generally less sophisticated, their
financing agreements are much more informal."); Orcutt, supra note 48, at 896 ("Why angels
employ weaker screening and monitoring mechanisms is not entirely clear. It could be due to
lack of sufficient resources or lack of knowledge on how to conduct such activities.").
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sophistication may partially explain angel contract design, 10 2 it
probably is not the primary explanation for two reasons. First, angels
are high net-worth individuals, or "accredited investors," not the sort
of investors who are generally considered unsophisticated. 103 After all,
securities laws use wealth as a proxy for sophistication and allow
issuers to forego disclosures to accredited investors.10 4 Second, angels
are overwhelmingly ex-entrepreneurs,1 0 5 which suggests that they not
only understand investing as a general matter, but start-up
investments in particular. Many angels made their fortunes after
going through the very same funding process on the other side, when
running their own start-ups.
The next two sections explore more likely reasons for the
traditional angel investment model, all of which support the notion
that angels are sophisticated investors who make smart investment
choices. Here, I agree with Vic Fleischer that whenever possible we
should look for rational over irrational explanations to describe the
behavior of sophisticated parties. 10 6 The explanations that follow will
confirm that. The first set of explanations reveals that the angel
investment model is rational from a financial perspective because of
angels' unique circumstances. The second set of explanations reveals
that angel investing is more than a purely financial endeavor, with
important nonfinancial goals that could be jeopardized if the venture
capital model were adopted.
Of course, for some angels, certain rationales from the
following set will be more important than others in driving behavior.
In that sense, the following rationales can be thought of as a "menu" of
options, with different angels picking and choosing the rationales that
best apply to their own situations. Given the wide variations within
102. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
103. See Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2
J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 74 (1998) (discussing the fact that the Small Business
Association's "ACE-Net" service, a matching service for small business issuers and angel
investors, defines angels as accredited investors).
104. Interpretative Release on Regulation D, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6455, 48 Fed.
Reg. 10,045, 10,045 (Mar. 10, 1983) ("[A]ccredited investors are not included in computing the
number of purchasers in offerings conducted in reliance on Rules 505 and 506. Also, if accredited
investors are the only purchasers in offerings under Rules 505 and 506, Regulation D does not
require delivery of specific disclosure."). Of course, it could also be that we do not think wealthy
individuals are necessarily more sophisticated for purposes of making investment decisions, but
that they are better able to absorb losses from poor decisions.
105. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
106. See Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-ups,
57 TAx L. REV. 137, 140 (2003) (asserting that "this Article calls attention to the value of seeking
out rational explanations before accepting irrational ones-especially when analyzing the
behavior of sophisticated experts").
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the category of traditional angels, there are many different reasons an
angel might choose a simple investment contract. The following are
five possible reasons for simple contracting by traditional angels.
1. Traditional Angel Contract Design as Financially Rational
a. The Need for Follow-On Venture CapitalFunding
The first reason that angel contract design is financially
rational is that angels are the first, but not the last, source of outside
funding for start-ups. 10 7 As discussed earlier, angels build the
10 8
financial bridge from friends-and-family money to venture capital.
Venture capital is needed for a start-up to have any realistic chance at
an IPO or even a high-dollar sale to a larger company. 10 9 Because
these are the very exits that make up angels' most lucrative returns"'0
and compensate angels for the far larger number of start-ups that fail,
angels must entice venture capitalists to follow their investments to
have any hope of profit.
This need for venture capital sets de facto limits on the terms
of the angel investment contract. To understand why this is so, it is
important to recognize that venture capitalists are flooded with
funding proposals, and accept maybe one to three percent of them."'
Funding proposals are rejected for a number of reasons, including a
lack of preexisting knowledge about the entrepreneur. 112 While the
presence of angels can generally attract (or at least not inhibit)

107. See Leavitt, supra note 19, at 224 ("Angels generally invest with the expectation that,
should the company progress as planned, one or more venture capital ('VC') firms will
subsequently invest.").
108. See supra Section IlI.A. On the other hand, some angels may invest in companies that
do not wish to go on to attract venture capital. See Sieverens, supra note 43, at 29 (noting that in
the fallout years after the dot.com bust, the Band of Angels investment organization was "more
willing to look at companies that are unlikely to go the venture capital route and can make do
with less. While those types of opportunities are not likely to be IPO candidates, they can often
be attractive acquisitions for larger concerns once their businesses are profitable and
established.").
109. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
110. Wiltbank & Boeker, supra note 77, at 1 (finding that 7% of angel exits provided 75% of
all investment returns through a study, albeit of angel groups).
111. See STROSS, supra note 13, at 24 (observing that well.known venture capitalist
Benchmark Capital received 1,500 funding proposals in 1997 and funded only nine); VAN
OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 146 (noting that "venture capitalists invest in only
about 1-3 percent of proposals received").
112. See STROSS, supra note 13, at 25.
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venture capital, 113 a venture capitalist might reject a funding proposal
because of an overreaching angel. A start-up marred by a complicated
angel round is unattractive to venture capitalists because it requires
them to "unwind" the non-standard angel preferences in order to
strike the venture capitalists' standard deal. In other words, venture
capitalists obtain their usual number of board seats, control rights,
and liquidation preferences in each investment. To the extent that
angels have obtained such rights and preferences, they must be
undone, or else venture capitalists must share with the angels and
obtain less than their standard deal. Because this unwinding takes
time, effort, and money-not to mention negotiations and a
subsequent relationship with an unhappy angel suddenly removed
venture capitalist faced with numerous
from the board' 1 4-the
investment candidates and limited resources may pass on the start-up
attached to an overreaching angel.
The literature confirms this disadvantage of a preference-filled
angel round. One survey found that ninety-four percent of venture
11 5
capitalists consider angels beneficial to the venture capital industry,
but forty-four percent also found angel-backed start-ups to be
unattractive candidates for funding when angels took "unnecessarily
complex terms. 11 16 (The most common complaint by venture
capitalists, however, is that angels overvalue the company.1 17) As a
result, early-stage venture capitalist John Callaghan cautions angels
against taking "unclean" terms, such as convertible debt instead of
common stock, because it may be seen as "extra 'baggage'" by venture
capitalists11 8 (although other venture capitalists appear to be more

113. See Wong, supra note 53, at 26 (asserting that "more angels leads to a faster time to
venture financing. This is evidence that angels can play a networking role; a larger number of
angels leads to a larger network of contacts and faster venture capital financing.").
114. MIT Study, supra note 67, at 46 ("Active angels are often requested to leave the Board
once professional investors participate in subsequent financing rounds .... They sometimes
resent being removed from the Board.").
115. Stanco & Akah, supra note 51, at 3; see also KAREN SOUTHWICK, THE KINGMAKERS:
VENTURE CAPITAL AND THE MONEY BEHIND THE NET 224-25 (2001) (discussing the fact that

some venture capitalists look down on angels as being amateurs or not on the venture capitalists'
level, although most venture capitalists still acknowledge the need for angels).
116. Stanco & Akah, supra note 51, at 11. Quotes from surveyed venture capitalists
emphasized the point. For example, one venture capitalist stated that "there is a tendency to
think a cram down and conversion [of an angel's preferred stock] to common is 'necessary' for
follow-on venture financing." Id. at 12. Another had the following advice for angels: "Deal
structuring so that terms don't complicate a VC round that follows. Creating the structure,
driving the company to key milestones, etc., to make follow-on VC rounds cleaner and more
likely." Id. at 15.
117. Id. at 11 (finding that 78% of venture capitalists registered this complaint).
118. Posting of John Callaghan to PEHUB (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
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comfortable with convertible debt 119). Susan Preston, an experienced
angel investor, also advises angels to keep the terms of their
investment simple because "[n]othing can prevent follow-on funding
faster than an overly complicated and burdensome first round, which
a VC must try to unwind, often demanding a discounted value and
other 'cram-down' requirements to offset onerous or overreaching firstround terms."'120 Jeffrey Sohl and Jill Areson-Perkins observe that
angels appear to understand their place in entrepreneurial finance
and the need for venture capital: "Seed investors [i.e., angels] appear
to make a concerted effort to not over burden the seed deal with
onerous terms and conditions that may inhibit the firm's ability to
attract larger rounds of equity capital in the future." 121
Therefore, angel contract design is financially rational because
angels are involved in a multiplayer game that involves both
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Early-stage venture capitalists
also face these de facto limitations on extracting preferences, albeit to
a lesser degree, and as a result their contracts appear to be less
comprehensive than later-stage venture capital contracts but more
comprehensive than angel contracts. 122 This is like a sliding scale
where the extent of permissible preferences depends on when and how
much is invested.1 23 Later-stage venture capitalists who are at the
very end of the sliding scale because they invest the most and the
latest do not face contracting limitations due to the need to attract
119. Convertible debt presents an interesting dilemma for venture capitalists. It creates a
more complicated angel round, but by deferring valuation until the next round, it allows venture
capitalists to eliminate their biggest problem with angels-overvaluation. See MIT Study, supra
note 67, at 38 ("Some high tech angels use convertible debt to avoid the battle over valuation
with the entrepreneur. These securities allow the venture capitalist or other second round
investors to set the value of the company in the next round... and provide the angel seed
investors a discount to that round."); see also D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND CASE STUDIES 160 (2004) (finding that angel
investors in Madison, Wisconsin-based NeoClone Biotechnology International, LLC took
convertible debt that allowed for conversion to equity on the upside, but offered debt's superior
protection on the downside).
120. SUSAN L. PRESTON, ANGEL INVESTMENT GROUPS, NETWORKS, AND FUNDS: A GUIDEBOOK
TO DEVELOPING THE RIGHT ANGEL ORGANIZATION FOR YOUR COMMUNITY 57 (2004).
121. Sohl & Areson-Perkins, supra note 83, at 5.
122. See Brian J. Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Renegotiation of Cash Flow Rights in the
Sale of VC-Backed Firms 51 tbl.1 (UC Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 956243, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=956243
(documenting that
venture capitalists take fewer liquidation preferences in the early stages than the later stages).
123. This may seem odd, that later-stage investors receive greater preferences given that
earlier stage investors take more risks. However, 'last-in, first-out" is standard practice in
venture capital investing. See Bartlett, supra note 19, at 76 ('%ater investors typically want to be
the first in line to get their original investment (and hopefully their return on investment) out.").
Early stage investors are compensated for their extra risk by receiving a larger share of the
company for less money.
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follow-on investors, at least before an exit. In the case of an exit by
IPO, investment bankers and public shareholders do "follow" the latestage venture capitalists, but this is accounted for: an IPO
automatically unwinds the venture capitalist's preferences, most
notably through the mandatory conversion of preferred stock to
124
common stock.
While venture capitalists as a group do not face the same de
facto limitations on contracting as angels, they do face significant
pressure from venture fund investors to produce high returns within a
relatively short timeframe. 125 This motivates them to go in the
opposite direction of angel investors and demand terms that will allow
them to meet fund investor expectations. Ron Gilson has observed
that the venture capital investment contract is "braided" with the
126
contract for fund investors for purposes of producing those returns.
While the angel investment contract is braided with the venture
capital investment contract to produce high returns, this is
accomplished in a different manner.
b. Informal Substitutes for Contract
The second reason that angel contract design is financially
rational is that the unique nature of the relationship between angel
and entrepreneur provides informal substitutes for the venture
capitalist's formal contract protections. The pre-investment nature of
this relationship reduces uncertainty and information asymmetry in
the way deals are sourced and selected, and the post-investment
nature of the relationship reduces agency costs by imposing informal
constraints on entrepreneurial opportunism.
Angel investing is highly localized, relationship-driven, and
industry-specific. Angels like to invest in start-ups where they know
either the entrepreneur or the substantive area (e.g., biotechnology or
e-commerce), and preferably both. 127 This preexisting knowledge
reduces uncertainty by allowing the angel to better gauge the startup's chances for success and reduces information asymmetry by
124. See Gilson & Schizer, supra note 31, at 885.
125. See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
126. Gilson, supra note 17, at 1091.
127. See Prowse, supra note 73, at 789 ("The primary criterion that angels use to screen
proposals is whether the entrepreneur is previously known and trusted by them or by an
associate who they trust."); Wong, supra note 53, at 28 (asserting that "angels have specialized
information and have a high ability to screen for higher quality projects. Many investors have
made their fortunes in the same industries that they subsequently invest in."). In some cases
passive angels invest outside of their geographic locality or area of expertise, but the active angel
in the syndicate will either be local or an industry expert, or both.
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minimizing the entrepreneur's advantage of private information. 128
The source of the angel's deal flow can also serve to reduce these
problems. Investment opportunities come to angels from a network of
trusted business associates (e.g., other angels) and, to a lesser degree,
from accountants and lawyers. 129 This "network of trust" serves an
important screening and sorting function by funneling high-quality
deals to angels while excluding low-quality deals. 130 The intimate way
in which angels learn of and select investments can also benefit startups by reducing the amount of due diligence required, thus shortening
the length of time from approach to funding. 3 1 The unsuccessful
attempts to create electronic matching services for angels and
entrepreneurs underscore the importance of familiarity and locality in
132
angel investing.
Of course, venture capital is also localized, relationship-driven,
and industry-specific when compared to many other forms of
investment.133 But venture capitalists must make more investments to
generate timely returns for fund investors, and this pressure
inevitably forces venture capitalists to sacrifice some of the intimacy
and familiarity with start-ups that angels without downstream
pressure enjoy. Furthermore, at least some venture capitalists might
not have the same entrepreneurial experience as angels; instead they
are relatively inexperienced MBAs.134 All of these differences, however
slight, mean that venture capitalists must rely on detailed contracts to

128. See Wong, supra note 53, at 4 ("Because the [venture capitalists] are not as familiar
with the entrepreneur as the local [angel] investors, more formal control mechanisms need to be
implemented to protect their investment.").
129. See Orcutt, supra note 48, at 895 (explaining that referrals from other angels are
considered high quality, while referrals from accountants and attorneys are considered of lower
quality).
130. Freear et al., supra note 56, at 11 (noting that localization produces efficiencies in the
angel market); MIT Study, supra note 67, at 28 (discussing how angels build their "network of
trust"); Jeffrey E. Sohl & Bruce Sommer, Angel Investing: Changing Strategies During Volatile
Times, at 20 (working paper, on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review) (finding that angels use
personal networks to overcome information asymmetry with entrepreneurs).
131. See SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 119, at 160 n.5 (explaining that entrepreneurs like
angels because they tend to perform less due diligence than venture capitalists).
132. See Sohl, supra note 42, at 115 ("Electronic networks have been largely unsuccessful to
date, less than 1%of equity capital raised in 1997 was harvested on-line.") (citation omitted).
133. See generally ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION
IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994) (describing the intimate Silicon Valley culture).
134. VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 109 (observing that "venture capitalists
for the most part have little entrepreneurial experience" and are instead " 'financial MBA-types'
"); cf. SOUTHWICK, supra note 115, at 66-67 (noting that some venture capitalists prefer to hire
individuals "who get an MBA and jump almost directly into the financial industry" while others
emphasize prior entrepreneurial experience-the latter being currently in vogue due to increasing
venture capitalist specialization).
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a greater degree than angels to reduce uncertainty and information
asymmetry.
In addition, the post-investment nature of the angelentrepreneur relationship allows angels to use informal substitutes in
lieu of the contractual monitoring rights and control mechanisms used
by venture capitalists. Angels actively participate in venture
development through regular visits to the start-up's facilities, which is
made possible by investing locally (in start-ups within a one- to twohour drive 135) and by establishing trust with entrepreneurs. 136 As
Wong notes, a "localized bond of trust may exist between the
entrepreneur and [angel] investor, making formal control mechanisms
unnecessary." 137 Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout also observe that
trust can reduce agency costs and substitute for complex contracts. 138
Of course, venture capitalists are also active investors in the sense
that they sit on boards and participate in major decisions, but the
angels' involvement is more intimate, routine, and hands-on.
Participating daily in venture development is a better check on
entrepreneurial
opportunism than attending periodic board
1 39
meetings.
c. Costly ContractingTheory
Yet another explanation for the financial rationality of angel
contract design comes from costly contracting theory. Costly
contracting theory, which has its origins in transaction cost

135. Sohl, supra note 42, at 112 (discussing how angels live close to their investments to
facilitate interactions and provide value-added services); MIT Study, supra note 67, at 32 ('Most
active angels will not invest in opportunities outside a 1-2 hour driving range.").
136. For more on the trust point, see infra Section III.C.2.b.
137. Wong, supranote 53, at 24.
138. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundationsof Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1757 (2001):
Where trust can be harnessed, it can substantially reduce the inefficiencies
associated with both agency and team production relationships.
Trust
permits transactions to go forward on the basis of a handshake rather than a
complex formal contract; it reduces the need to expend resources on constant
monitoring of employees and business partners; and it avoids the uncertainty
and expense associated with trying to enforce formal and informal
agreements in court.
139. Wong suggests that the large residual claim held by entrepreneurs (angels take only
about 20% of the company in exchange for their investment) better aligns the interests of angels
and entrepreneurs than in venture capital (venture capitalists take 33-40%). Wong, supra note
53, at 22. Even if the difference in percentage ownership is not significant (Wong acknowledges
the possibility), the fact that the angel's stock is common like the entrepreneur's, while the
venture capitalist's stock is preferred, may lend some support to Wong's suggestion that angelentrepreneur incentives are better aligned.
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economics, 140 predicts that the level of contract complexity will depend
on the costs of determining, negotiating, monitoring, enforcing, and
even drafting a contract's provisions' 4 ' and, of course, the amount of
funds at risk. Benjamin Klein observes that "complete contractual
specification entails wasteful search and negotiation costs associated
with discovering and negotiating prespecified contractual responses to
all potential contingencies," and that "most future events can be
accommodated at lower cost after the relevant information is
revealed."' 42 For this reason, Gompers and Lerner tell us that
"covenants are included only when the benefits of restricting activity
are greater than its costs."'143 They advise venture capitalists to
"balance the benefits of restricting activities with the cost of
negotiating the provisions, writing the contractual clauses, and
144
monitoring compliance."'
Because its five protective devices add significant complexity to
the relationship, the venture capital investment contract is costlier to
design, write, monitor, and enforce than the angel investment
contract. 45 This is rationally so: venture capitalists make larger
investments, are in control of those investments for a longer period of
time (until exit), and have significant downstream pressure from fund
investors. Angels, on the other hand, rationally might choose to forego
preference-laden contracts because the costs relative to the amount of
the investment would be disproportionately high, 146 the duration of

140. Transaction cost economics dictates that both ex ante and ex post costs of contracting be
considered. Ex ante costs are "the costs of drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement;"
ex post costs are the costs of enforcement and enforcement mechanisms. OLIVER WILLIAMSON,

THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 20-21 (1985). The recognition that expost processes
are not costless was a significant advancement of transaction cost economics over neoclassical
economics. On the relationship between costly contracting theory and transaction cost economics,
see GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 11, at 31 (equating costly contracting theory with
Williamson's arguments on contractual completeness); Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, The Law
and Economics of Costly Contracting,20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 3 n.1 (2004).
141. See Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs, 46
THEORY & DECISION 23, 38 (1999) ("Complexity is not necessarily associated with devising the
contract but rather with the writing and enforcement of such a contract.").
142. Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual
Relationships,34 ECON. INQUIRY 444, 447 (1996).
143. GOMPERS & LERNER, supranote 11, at 31.
144. Id. at 33.
145. See Schwartz & Watson, supra note 140, at 16 ("Complex contracts - those having a
greater number of clauses or requiring a court to evaluate information from many different
sources - are assumed to be more expensive to write than are simpler contracts.").
146. See VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 174 (quoting an angel as saying
that the "legals were disproportionate to the size of the investment"). There has been at least one
attempt to create a model to predict the optimal level of contractual completeness in a given
situation. See Ronald A. Dye, Costly ContractingContingencies,26 INT'L ECON. REV. 233 (1985).
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the preferences would be short due to venture capital unwinding, 147
and angels lack the need for some provisions (e.g., terms regarding
exit are less important because angels do not face the same
downstream pressures as venture capitalists). 148 This is analogous to
the situation of debt financing: only creditors extending large amounts
of credit find it worthwhile to negotiate loan covenants. 149 For all of
these reasons, costly contracting theory predicts detailed contracts for
venture capitalists and simpler contracts for traditional angels, which
is indeed the result.
d. Reputationaland Court Sanctions?
Finally, to what extent can reputational and court sanctions
reduce an angel's agency costs in the absence of a comprehensive
investment contract? Invoking costly contracting theory once more,
contracts will be simpler when self-enforcement, in addition to courtenforcement, is available to an aggrieved party. 150 It is unclear,
however, to what extent this is relevant to the design of angel
contracts, or venture capital contracts for that matter. The
conventional wisdom is that the tight-knit nature of communities such
as Silicon Valley creates a reputation market among venture
capitalists and entrepreneurs, which explains the lack of litigation
between them. 151 Some scholars contend that the fear of acquiring a
bad reputation serves as an extra-legal constraint on the venture
capitalists' ability to exploit entrepreneurs,1 52 while others are more
1 53
skeptical of this explanation.
If a reputation market does exist between venture capitalists
and entrepreneurs, it also must exist between angels and

147. See supra Section III.C.l.a.
148. See Goldfarb et al., supra note 55, at 2 ("Our results suggest that legal control in seed
rounds is not cost-effective because these investments are generally small.").
149. I thank Jesse Fried for this observation.
150. See Klein, supra note 142, at 455 (discussing the complimentary relationship of selfenforcement and court-enforcement).
151. See D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contractingin the InformationAge, 2 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 153-54 (1998) (describing the conventional wisdom).
152. See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 252-53 (1998) (arguing that
reputational constraints imposed by geographic proximity between venture capitalists and
entrepreneurs are an adequate check on venture capitalist opportunism); Sahlman, supra note
32, at 513.
153. See Smith, supra note 151, at 160-62 (observing that neither entrepreneurs nor venture
capitalists have a vehicle for amalgamating or transmitting information about venture capitalist
reputation, such as a stock exchange or required disclosures, and that entrepreneurs may have
self-serving reasons not to pass along negative information about venture capitalists).
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entrepreneurs because that relationship involves even greater
localization, familiarity, and intimacy. Here, however, the extra-legal
constraint is on entrepreneurs as the party with the contractual
ability to exploit angels. The angels' self-enforcement mechanism-the
reputational sanction-might prevent entrepreneurial opportunism
even when the investment contract does not, much like the
entrepreneurs' self-enforcement mechanism is thought to prevent
venture capitalist opportunism. In other words, an angel's ability to
complain about an entrepreneur could serve as a powerful deterrent,
making venture capitalists leery of investing in the start-up. This is a
double-edged sword, however: if venture capitalists do not invest, the
start-up will not be a "home run" and angels will be denied a large
return. 154 This means that angels have self-interested reasons not to
expose entrepreneurs' opportunism, at least until after venture
capitalists invest. 15 5 Therefore, it is unclear to what extent angels
leverage self-enforcement, even if they have the opportunity to do so.
Another interesting question is whether it is possible that
potential legal sanctions could be bolstered through a simple contract.
Angels, as minority shareholders in what are then close corporations,
could look to the judicial remedies that have been fashioned to address
minority shareholder oppression.156 It is unlikely, however, that
angels will prevail on a minority oppression claim against
entrepreneurs.15 7 The classic "freeze-out" involves a minority
shareholder who is removed from his posts as director, officer, and
employee. Having no employment, dividend stream, or exit rights, he
is convinced by the majority shareholder to sell his shares for a low
price. 58 Courts that protect such minority shareholders through the
oppression doctrine might be hesitant to extend the doctrine to angels,
who are often only shareholders, not employees, and do not lose out on
expected employment income. Also, courts might be less sympathetic
to angels given their sophistication and bargaining power over

154. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
155. Of course, allegations of unscrupulous behavior could haunt the entrepreneur in the
future, although there is some question as to whether the typical entrepreneur is a "serial"
entrepreneur who would be harmed by such allegations. Venture capitalists are obviously repeat
players and therefore must be concerned about their reputations.
156. See generally F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE
CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1998) (discussing the dynamics of close corporations and recent court
decisions affecting them).
157. For a discussion of an angel's potential minority oppression claims against venture
capitalists, see generally Leavitt, supra note 19.
158. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 658-62 (Mass.
1976).
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entrepreneurs. 15 9 Up to seventy percent of IPO firms choose to
incorporate in Delaware and be governed by Delaware corporate
law, 160 which presents yet another hurdle because Delaware courts do
not help minority shareholders who fail to help themselves through
contract. 16 1 On the other hand, it is possible that an angel's threat to
bring a fiduciary duty suit against a cash-poor entrepreneur might
have some deterrent effect on the entrepreneur's opportunistic
behavior.
In sum, it is unclear to what extent the possibility of
reputational and court sanctions are rational reasons for angels to
forego protective investment contracts. Better reasons include the
need for follow-on venture capital funding, informal substitutes for
contract, and costly contracting theory.
2. Nonfinancial Motivations
a. Nonfinancial Reasons for Angel Investing
The previous Section revealed that traditional angel
investment contracts are rational from a financial perspective. In
venture capital, the story ends here. Venture capitalists invest for
purely financial reasons mainly because venture capitalists are
financial intermediaries; their capital comes almost entirely from fund
investors who demand timely (and high) returns. 162 Venture
capitalists are the general partners in venture funds. The limited
partners of these funds-including pension funds, endowments, and
foundations-supply the fund with capital and take about eighty
percent of the returns. For their efforts, the venture capitalists
typically receive a management fee of two percent of the invested
funds and twenty percent of the profits (the "carry"). 163
159. See supra notes 96, 100-04 and accompanying text.
160. See Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559,
1563 tbl. 1 (2002) (presenting empirical findings on the incorporation choices of IPO firms).
161. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379 (Del. 1993).
162. See STROSS, supra note 13, at 87 (observing that in the mid-1990s venture capitalist
Benchmark Partners pledged to contribute 3% of a fund's capital, compared to the industry
standard of 1%); Gilson, supra note 17, at 1071 (finding that a venture capitalist puts up only
one percent of the capital).
163. Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, An Analysis of Compensation in the US Venture Capital
Partnership, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 3-27 (1999) (conducting an empirical study that found
management fees of 2-3% and a large concentration of carry at 20%); see also Victor Fleischer,
Two and Twenty: Taxing PartnershipProfits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 23-24
(2008) (criticizing the tax treatment of the carry as capital gain instead of ordinary income). But
see Litvak, supra note 19, at 3-4 (critiquing the Gompers and Lerner study on staleness and
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Venture funds have a maximum life of ten to twelve years
before they must liquidate and make final distributions to fund
investors. 164 During a particular fund's life, the venture capitalist
begins soliciting investments for its next fund, often from the same
investors. Gompers and Lerner have described this process of
recycling investments in venture funds and then redeploying those
funds to new start-ups as the "venture capital cycle."'165 While a good
return on start-up investments increases the venture capitalist's
carry, it also has another function-to entice the limited partners to
continue to invest in the venture capitalist's future funds. This
downstream pressure results in highly motivated venture capitalists
willing to use their bargaining power over entrepreneurs to secure the
66
most protective investment contracts possible.
The financial story, however, is not the full story of angel
investment. Unlike venture capital, angel investing is not necessarily
a purely financial exercise. Angels are not financial intermediaries
who face downstream pressure to satisfy fund investors. 167 Instead,
one of the defining characteristics of angel investment is the use of
personal funds. 168 The use of personal funds has its disadvantages: it
is always preferable to spend someone else's money rather than one's
own where there is a risk of losing it, and too many losses will
threaten the angel's ability to make future investments. On the other
hand, investing one's own funds provides a measure of freedom not
available to venture capitalists. 16 9 If an angel chooses to invest for
personal reasons, she has that luxury.

methodological grounds and concluding from an independent study that "the compensation of
VCs varies significantly across venture firms").
164. GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 11, at 19 ("Almost all venture and buyout funds are
designed to be 'self-liquidating,' that is, to dissolve after ten or twelve years.").
165. Id. at 4.
166. The need to control the start-up's exit, in particular, is a product of the venture capital
cycle. See Smith, supra note 33, at 316 (describing how the exit "allows fund investors to
evaluate the quality of their venture capitalists and, if necessary, to reallocate their funds away
from venture capital to other investment vehicles or from less successful venture capitalists to
more successful venture capitalists").
167. See VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 99 (observing that the "agency
relationship for the venture capitalist firm (with its fund providers) forces the venture capitalist
to choose different investment practices from those of the less-restricted (and less-accountable)
business angel').
168. See supra note 1.
169. Sohl, supra note 42, at 111 ("Angels typically have longer exit horizons than their
venture fund counterparts and thus the capital they provide is termed patient capital.").
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Although many, if not most, angels invest primarily for
financial reasons, 170 angels also have nonfinancial reasons for
investing. A distinguishing characteristic of angel investment is that
angels "usually develop an emotional attachment to the business
venture. In contrast, VCs have financial reward as their only incentive
and therefore minimize emotional attachment."' 171 First and foremost,
angels relish the chance to participate in a new venture's
development. Many if not most angels are ex-entrepreneurs who miss
the excitement of being part of a start-up but not necessarily the
headaches and grueling schedule that come with full responsibility for
one. 172 The chance to become active in another entrepreneur's venture
can stave off the boredom of retirement. According to one angel, "it's
cheaper and more fun than buying a yacht." 173 Indeed, the angel's
desire for participation is so strong that her choice between competing
investment opportunities may be dictated by the opportunity for
1 74
participation more than any other factor.
Geographic proximity facilitates participation and is, therefore,
one of the two most important factors to angels when considering
potential investments. 75 Angels typically invest in start-ups that are
located within an hour or two of their residences or offices so that they
176
can visit and consult with entrepreneurs on a regular basis.
Through these visits, angels offer value-added services to
entrepreneurs in the form of seasoned advice on early-stage venture
development. Angel participation usually happens informally,

170. See VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 116-17 (contending that financial
gain is the primary motivation for angel investment, and citing one angel as disfavoring the term
"angel" investor because it implies the precedence of altruism over financial reward).
171. MICHAEL STATHIS, THE STARTUP COMPANY BIBLE FOR ENTREPRENEURS

134 (2004)

(emphasis removed).
172. VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 117-18; MIT Study, supra note 67, at
14 ("Angels enjoy the adrenaline rush of emerging company volatility, but without the 80-hour
workweeks and the burden of ultimate responsibility for the company.").
173. VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 117.
174. Id. at 139 (observing that "angels most often chose one investment over another
primarily according to the opportunity to get actively involved in the investee firm"). Of course,
syndication means that each start-up will have an active angel and several passive ones; those
passive angels may be the active angels in other ventures.
175. MIT Study, supra note 67, at 31 (finding through a survey of experienced angels that
geographic proximity to the angel was one of the two most important criteria when considering
potential investments).
176. See supra note 135.
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although sometimes the angel will enter into a formal employment or
177
consulting relationship with the start-up.
In addition to the private benefits that angels obtain from
participating in new venture development, some angels invest for
altruistic reasons. Angels often express the desire to "give back" to the
entrepreneurial community that made them wealthy doing what they
loved. This altruism can take the form of helping emergent
entrepreneurs become successful, investing in start-ups seeking to
commercialize socially useful technology (e.g., green/clean technology),
and investing in start-ups that will create jobs in the angel's
community.178 These nonfinancial benefits are said to produce "psychic
income" 179 and have led part-time angel investor Brad Feld to describe
1 80
angel investing as "for-profit philanthropy."
b. Contract, Trust, and Achieving Nonfinancial Goals
What do these nonfinancial goals of participation and altruism
have to do with the use of simple investment contracts? The literature
on the relationship between contract and trust reveals that requiring
entrepreneurs to enter into venture-capital-like contracts, which could
be seen by entrepreneurs as aggressive and self-serving, would
jeopardize the angel's nonfinancial goals by signaling a lack of trust in
the entrepreneur. Most of the literature views contract and trust as
substitutes-in other words, contract is necessary when trust is
absent and unnecessary when trust is present.1l 1 A particularly

177. See John Freear et al., Angels: Personal Investors in the Venture Capital Market, 7
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & REGIONAL DEV. 85, 92 (1995) (noting that nearly 25% of angels work in a
full- or part-time capacity in their investment start-ups).
178. Freear et al., supra note 56, at 11 ("The most influential non-financial factor was the
satisfaction derived from assisting an entrepreneur build a successful business."); Wetzel, supra
note 67, at 31; MIT Study, supra note 67, at 14 (discussing the "empathy" that angels feel for
entrepreneurs and the desire to help them avoid mistakes that angels themselves may have
made as entrepreneurs).
179. Wetzel, supra note 67, at 31.
180. Feld Thoughts, Is it Angel Investing or For-Profit Philanthropy?, http://www.
feld.com/blog/archives/002013.html (Oct. 23, 2006, 18:42 EST).
181. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1487 (2005) ("Contracts
may thus be viewed as the 'antithesis of simple trust.' "); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract.
Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 185, 186 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (arguing
that "contract begins from a situation of distrust"); Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L.
REV. 553 (2001) (explaining that law can undermine trust); cf. Deepak Malhotra & J. Keith
Murnigham, The Effect of Contracts on Interpersonal Trust, 47 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 534, 556 (2002)
(arguing that the relationship between trust and contract "appears to be far from clean and
simple"). But see T.K. Das & Bing-Sheng Teng, Between Trust and Control: Developing
Confidence in Partner Cooperation in Alliances, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 491, 496 (1998) (finding
that trust and control can function as parallel phenomena); Carol Rose, Trust in the Mirror of

2008]

ANGEL INVESTORS

1441

interesting strain of this literature addresses the use of contract as a
signaling device. It examines what the use or nonuse of a particular
contract or contract provision implies about trust and the
trustworthiness of the party who is asked to agree to it.
As Stewart Macaulay observed in his famous article on the
importance of noncontractual relations in business, overly detailed
contracts indicate a "lack of trust" in the other party and can turn "a
cooperative venture into an antagonistic horse-trade." 18 2 In another
important article on the role of trust in the law, Blair and Stout make
the same point through the use of a hypothetical: "Suppose a potential
business partner shows up armed with a lawyer and a ten-page
contract loaded with fine print. What does that behavior suggest?
Most obviously, a reluctance to trust."18 3 Likewise, Kathryn Spier
observes that "an individual may refrain from including a particular
clause in a contract in order to signal his type." 18 4 For example, an
athlete might forego asking for an injury clause, which would signal
accident-proneness, and a spouse might forego a prenuptial
18 5
agreement, which would signal the possibility of divorce.
Consider the signaling effect of a detailed, preference-laden
contract in the context of angel investing. If an angel presents an
entrepreneur with such a contract that must be signed before
receiving funds, the entrepreneur may interpret it as a lack of trust, or
that the relationship will be more combative than cooperative.1 8 6 And
if entrepreneurs think this, then angels' nonfinancial goals are
jeopardized.
How might the use of such complex contracts signal a lack of
trust? First, angel participation in venture development must be
welcomed by entrepreneurs if it is to occur informally. The trust
angels hope to develop in order to invite participation is what Oliver
Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531, 554 (1995) (observing that law can induce trust by allowing
contracting in situations where it otherwise would not occur).
182. Steward Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. Soc. REV. 55, 64 (1963). Macaulay was focused on ongoing business relationships. It could be
said that angel finance does not present the same situation because angels usually fund one
round in a particular start-up and then make room for the venture capitalists. However, angel
finance is a multi-period game in the sense that it is localized within small geographic
communities where entrepreneurs may know one another, meaning that an angel's reputation
transcends any one relationship.
183. Blair & Stout, supranote 138, at 1806.
184. Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signaling, 23 RAND J. ECON. 432, 432
(1992).
185. Id. at 433.
186. This is especially true if not requiring such contracts is embedded in angel financing
practice, as it appears to be. The classic article on embeddedness is Mark Granovetter, Economic
Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481 (1985).
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Williamson called "calculative" trust, or strategic behavior driven by
external reward.8 7 Angels attempt to secure this trust by being the
opposite of venture capitalists-investors who do not demand onerous
contracts. By the type of contract they choose, angels brand
themselves as the good guys compared to venture capitalists.18 8 Of
course, angels could forego trust and attempt to secure participation
rights formally through contract, but this might be difficult for several
reasons: participation rights may be tricky to define and costly to
contextualize, and they may create unwanted, concomitant duties for
angels through a formal employment or consulting relationship.
Second, requiring a detailed, protective contract risks
obscuring any altruistic signal the angel wishes to send. If angels are
investing to help young entrepreneurs along, being seen as overly
concerned with downside protection does not suggest that the angel
has high hopes for the start-up. Instead, it signals doubt and a desire
to limit financial losses (or, perhaps even worse, a desire to extract a
disproportionate share of financial gains). On the other hand, use of a
simple, entrepreneur-friendly contract sends precisely the opposite
signal-it exhibits trust and therefore reinforces the angels' altruistic
message. This type of trust-"true" trust that exhibits an "otherregarding preference" (as opposed to trust secured for personal gain)has been referred to as "internalized" trust.189
In sum, all of these reasons I have explored-the need for
follow-on venture capital funding, informal substitutes for contract,
costly contracting theory, and nonfinancial goals of participation and
altruism-might explain why angels rationally forego the venture
capital model and instead invest in start-ups on simple, non-protective
terms. The next Part looks at why this model might be changing.

187. Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 453, 453-72 (1993).
188. See generally Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: the Branding Effect of CorporateDeal
Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581 (2006) (discussing the use of contracts and deal structure for
branding purposes).
189. Blair & Stout, supra note 138, at 1750-51. Williamson, on the other hand, thought such
non-calculative notions of trust were best reserved for "very special relations between family,
friends, and lovers" and had no place in commercial exchange. Williamson, supra note 187, at
484.
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IV. THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF ANGEL INVESTING

A. The Rise of Angel Groups
Traditional angel investments still constitute the bulk of the
angels market. They account for somewhere between seventy and
ninety percent of all angel investments.1 90 Traditional angel
investments also present the most interesting (and misunderstood)
story in investment contract design, as has been discussed. However, a
marked shift in angel investing is underway that also must be
explored.
In the mid- to late-1990s, angels began to depart from their
longstanding mode of informal, secretive operation and moved into the
open by creating regional angel groups. 191 In 1994, Hans Severiens
(now deceased) founded the first prominent and probably still bestknown angel group-Silicon Valley's "Band of Angels." 192 The Band of
Angels began with twelve members, but by 1998 had grown to 110
members. 193 Not only did the Band of Angels' membership grow-the
idea of formally organizing regional angel groups caught on
throughout the country. By 1997 there were fifty angel groups, and by
2002 there were 170.194 The Angel Capital Association ("ACA"), which
is the leading trade organization of angel groups in the United States,
reported 114 "full ACA-member" angel groups in 2006.195 Although the
reasons for the trend toward angel groups are worthy of more
exploration than I will offer here, some likely explanations include a
steadier stream of deal flow, increased opportunities for interaction
with other angels and venture capitalists, the chance to fund larger
deals through the pooling of resources, and the ability to invest in
amounts large enough to justify the transaction costs of preferred
stock. 196

190. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
191. Angel groups are alternatively referred to as angel investment organizations, angel
alliances, or angel syndicates.
192. Band of Angels, www.bandangels.com (last visited Aug. 18, 2008).
193. MIT Study, supra note 67, at 13. According to the Band of Angels website, membership
is now above 120. Band of Angels, www.bandangels.com (last visited Aug. 18, 2008).
194. See James Geshwiler, Common Angels: An Evolving Tradition, in STATE OF THE ART
134, supra note 43, at 141 (citing research by Jeffrey Sohl).
195. See ACA Angel Group Confidence Report, supranote 8.
196. I thank Jesse Fried for suggesting the last reason as a possible explanation for the
development of angel groups. As he has argued elsewhere, the investment in preferred stock can
protect angels against venture capitalist opportunism. See generally Fried & Ganor, supra note
36; Leavitt, supra note 19.
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Angel groups differ in their precise modes of operation, but
they have common traits. 197 Unlike traditional angels, angel groups
are not difficult to find; most have websites providing information
about the organization for potential members and entrepreneurs. On
198
the other hand, the members' identities may be guarded carefully.
In terms of membership, some angel groups require only that
members be accredited investors. Others, including the Band of
Angels, require technical expertise (e.g., in engineering) and therefore
exclude the likes of lawyers and accountants. 199 Industry-specific
angel groups, unsurprisingly, require substantial knowledge of the
200
industry.
In addition, while angel groups still rely on references to find
investments, they also employ more formal mechanisms for bringing
investment opportunities to members. First, there is a pre-screening
process to determine whether an entrepreneur will be evaluated by
the angel group's full membership, which can include review of an
online application, a favorable recommendation from an angel group
member, and even the satisfactory completion of initial due diligence.
Next, the pre-screened entrepreneurs are invited to present to the full
angel group membership. 20 ' The presentations usually run twenty to
thirty minutes and are followed by a short question-and-answer
session. These often occur over lunch or dinner meetings. If any angel
in the group has an interest in moving forward on a particular startup, the process progresses further with more meetings, more diligence,
and finally an investment.

197. Jeffrey Sohl distinguishes angel groups from traditional angels by their "size, visibility,
and entrance mechanism." Sohl, supra note 42, at 113.
198. See VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 44 ("To retain members'
anonymity, many of these syndicates.., establish a storefront (or facade) for the general
public.").
199. Compare Carol Sands, The Angels' Forum and The Halo Fund: The Rise of the
Professional Angel, in STATE OF THE ART 32, supra note 43, at 32 ("It was clear to [Silicon
Valley's The Angels' Forum organization] that diversity was the key to successful development,
so we set out to assemble a group of dedicated angel investors with different skill sets
(operations, engineering, finance, sales, marketing, business development, legal, and human
resources)."), with Severiens, supra note 43, at 22 (noting that the Band of Angels "organizing
committee made it clear right from the start that membership in our group would be limited to
those with high-tech credentials, and thus lawyers, bankers, real estate developers, and so on
were not the kind of members we were seeking").
200. For example, all members of Silicon Valley's Tenex Medical Investors have "substantial
life science expertise." Norm Sokoloff, Tenex Medical Investors: Niche Investing, in STATE OF THE
ART 42, supra note 43, at 44.
201. See, e.g., MIT Study, supra note 67, at 61.
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Most angel groups leave individual investment decisions to
each member's discretion. 20 2 Interested members invest in their own
names or together through a new investment vehicle (such as a
limited liability company). 20 3 Therefore, most angel groups do not
invest as an entity-their members invest individually or through a
separate company. However, a small number of angel groups pool all
20 4
members' funds and finance selected start-ups from this pool.
Angel group investments have become an important part of
angel investing. 20 5 Like traditional angels, angel groups primarily
fund start-ups in their earliest stages. Angel group investments often
fall within the same $100,000 to one- to two-million dollar range as
traditional angel investments with probably more investments on the
lower end of that scale. 206 However, the increased opportunities for
pooling also may facilitate larger investments, 20 7 and those larger
investments may come at a slightly later stage of start-up
development than traditional angel investments: either just before or
in place of early-stage venture capital investments. With most venture
capitalists today attracting more money from fund investors and
moving to even later-stage investments, where larger sums can be put
to more efficient use, a new capital gap from two million to five million
dollars is emerging. 208 Some angel groups able to invest larger sums
may prove to be the "white knights" that are capable of filling this
gap, 20 9 although this is still on the high side for most angel groups.
202. See, e.g., VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 45 (describing the typical
practice: "Each member can decide individually whether to participate in a particular deal that
the syndicate decides to undertake and how much he or she wants to be involved in each
investment they make."); Severiens, supra note 43, at 23 ("Right from the start, it was decided
that [Band of Angels] would not pool our funds. Not everyone is interested in the deals some of
us invest in, so we leave it to the individual members to invest according to their tastes,
interests, and risk profiles.").
203. Severiens, supra note 43, at 23 ("[W]hen [Band of Angels] invest[s] in a single deal, a
pool is formed, but we still act as individuals and the stock certificates are made out in our
individual names.").
204. See Sands, supra note 199, at 35-39.
205. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (discussing estimates on the aggregate size
of the angels market and breakdown between traditional angel investments and angel group
investments).
206. See Goff, supra note 77, at 75 ("The Sierra Angels' funding 'sweet spot' is $200,000 to
$1,000,000."); see also ACA Angel Group Confidence Report, supra note 8 (noting that the
average amount of total funding provided by each U.S. angel group in 2006 was $1.78 million).
207. VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 43-44 (finding that angel groups allow
angels to "make larger and more frequent investments (though these remain smaller than those
funded by even small venture capital firms)").
208. Sohl, supra note 46, at 15.
209. See Susan Preston, Seraph Capital Forum: National Trends in a Local Context, in
STATE OF THE ART 62, supra note 43, at 68 ("With venture capitalists moving farther up the

1446

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:5:1405

The Band of Angels was formed with the goal of filling this gap in
210
mind.
B. The Angel Groups'Move Toward Venture Capital-Like Contracts
This "professionalization" of angel investing through the
formation of angel groups has brought with it a change in the angel
investment model. Given that angel groups are a product of the last
decade, they still account for only a very small portion of the literature
on angels. In particular, empirical studies on the terms of angel group
investment contracts are currently lacking. 211 However, a few case
studies, along with anecdotal accounts, suggest that angel group
investment contracts bear a closer resemblance to venture capital
contracts than to traditional angel contracts, albeit without some of
the venture capitalist's bells and whistles.
A 2000 study from MIT's Entrepreneurship Center found that
most angel groups "have modeled their terms and conditions after
venture capital deals which include demand rights, voting
rights/Board representation, registration rights, piggyback rights,
anti-dilution provisions and information rights."21 2 The MIT study
cited two Harvard Business School case studies in support of this
conclusion, one of which focused on the Band of Angels. 2 13 I have
examined standard term sheets used by the Tech Coast Angels, the
country's largest angel group (based in Southern California), which
214
also reveal the inclusion of most common venture capital terms.
Anecdotal accounts also reveal that angel groups favor
preferred over common stock. For instance, the Band of Angels
"invest[s] almost solely in preferred stock, and often it will be the first
round of outside capital, the preferred A."21 5 Boston's Angel
Healthcare Investors contract for "preferred security, dividends where

funding chain, a second funding gap has opened up between $2 million and $5 million-a gap that
few individual angels can fill. The potential white knight is the angel organization.").
210. See Severiens, supra note 43, at 20-21.
211. It should be much easier to conduct empirical studies of angel groups than traditional
angels because they are far more visible. This Article should also provide a framework for
designing these studies, at least to the extent they are concerned with contract design.
212. MIT Study, supra note 67, at 63.
213. Id.
214. Series A Preferred Stock Financing Term Sheet (on file with the Vanderbilt Law
Review); XZY Venture Inc. Summary of Deal Terms (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review). I
thank Luis Villalobos for providing these.
215. Severiens, supra note 43, at 23. But see Geshwiler, supra note 194, at 142-43 (finding
that Common Angels "recommend a fairly standard, clean term sheet without multiple
liquidation preference, too low a valuation, or other 'bells and whistles' ").
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applicable, preemptive rights, antidilution protection, and board
observation rights."216 Board seats may also be a more common
217
feature in angel group contracts than in traditional angel contracts.
Where board seats are not secured, board observation rights (i.e., the
right to attend and participate in board meetings but not the right to
218
vote) probably are included.
But again, it must be emphasized that, without more
information about angel groups, including empirical studies of their
investment contracts, it is difficult to tell to what extent the typical
angel group contract replicates the venture capital contract. Based on
the limited information available, the trend is for at least preferred
stock over common and some sort of board rights, with the more
sophisticated angel groups adopting even more of the venture
21 9
capitalists' standard terms.
This leads to another question that cannot be answered yet:
What counts as a "typical" angel group? The Band of Angels and Tech
Coast Angels, which we know the most about, are sophisticated
operations in investment-rich California. Angel groups in other
regions (especially outside of major metropolises) may look and
function very differently. On the other hand, other angel groups may
have more or less adopted the more sophisticated angel groups' model
in the same way that law firms outside of Silicon Valley have adopted

216. Robyn C. Davis et al., Angel Healthcare Investors: Capitalizingon Innovation, in STATE
OF THE ART 146, supra note 43, at 157; see also STATHIS, supra note 171, at 133 ("[T]he increasing
trend is for angels to receive preferred stock, although it lacks many of the stipulations found in
the preferred stock issued to venture capitalists.").
217. See, e.g., Severiens, supra note 43, at 22 (reporting that a Band of Angels member who
serves as the sponsor of a start-up in front of the entire group will take a seat on the board if an
investment is made).
218. Goff, supranote 77, at 76:
The Sierra Angels encourages its portfolio companies to choose the most
effective candidates for heir boards of directors rather than insist that the
network be given a seat. In instances when the group does not have a board
seat, our member sponsor frequently acts as an informal advisor, and, as a
rule, we expect visiting privileges at board meeting[s].
219. The angel group will be even harder to distinguish from the early stage venture
capitalist if the hallmark of angel investing-the investment of personal funds-is relaxed and
angel groups also begin to invest other people's money. Indeed, some angel groups are now doing
just that by tacking on "sidecar" investments for an angel's friends and family to at least some
deals. See Sands, supra note 199, at 39 (finding that the Angels' Forum's "creation of The Halo
Fund in 2000 allowed our friends and family members as well as institutional investors to coinvest in the group's best deals"). So in a sense, angels are now also investing other people's
money, although the ratio is extremely small compared to the venture capitalists' predominant
use of investment funds. Still, the trend is toward a further blurring of the angel/venture
capitalist line.
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Silicon Valley form contracts for venture capital financings. 220 Based
on the limited information available, it appears that the formalization
and professionalization of angel investing has brought with it a move
toward venture capital-like contracts.
C. ExplainingAngel Group Investment Contracts
If there is indeed a shift toward venture capital-like contracts
in angel group investments, what are we to make of this? On the one
hand, angel group investment contracts might be seen as an overdue
corrective for traditional angel naivet6. For those who accept the
conventional wisdom about traditional angels, this stands as the ready
explanation. On the other hand, in light of this Article's rational
explanations for traditional angel contracts, angel group contracts are
themselves a puzzle. Can it be rational for traditional angels to invest
on simple, non-protective terms similar to those taken by minority
shareholders in close corporations, yet equally rational for angel
groups to invest on detailed, protective terms resembling those taken
by venture capitalists? The answer is yes for several reasons, all of
which stem from the fact that angel groups more closely resemble
early-stage venture capitalists than traditional angels in a number of
important ways. Some of these resemblances have been mentioned,
but their relevance to contract design will now be explored in more
detail.
First, an angel group's higher investment amounts, slightly
later investments, and relationships with venture capitalists allow it
to move further down the sliding scale of permissible preferences than
221
the traditional angel without the fear of venture capital unwinding.
While the traditional angel has close relationships
with
entrepreneurs, angel groups are more plugged into local venture
capital communities. 222 If angel groups do not have preexisting
relationships with venture capitalists, a steadier deal flow makes
them repeat players in entrepreneurial finance and these
relationships can quickly develop. Because of these relationships,

220. Mark C. Suchman, On Advice of Counsel: Law Firms and Venture Capital Funds as
Information Intermediaries in the Structuration of Silicon Valley (1994) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with Stanford Sociology Department).
221. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
222. See Band of Angels, About the Band FAQs, http://www.bandangels.comlfaqs /index.php
(last visited Aug. 18, 2008) (stating that Band of Angels founder Hans Severiens was a former
venture capitalist "who formed friendships with many of the first generation of Silicon Valley
entrepreneurs and high technology executives-the founders of Fairchild, National
Semiconductor, Genentech, Intel, Compaq, Kleiner Perkins, and Sequoia").
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angel group members may have a better understanding of the venture
capital process and refrain from overvaluing start-ups, thereby
eliminating the venture capitalists' most common complaint about
angels. 223 In short, venture capitalists tend to view angel groups as the
equivalent of early-stage venture capitalists and allow them to
224
contract accordingly.
Second, a more arms-length relationship with entrepreneurs
reduces an angel group's ability to rely on informal substitutes for
contract. Recall that referrals from a traditional angel's "network of
trust," layered on top of her prior knowledge of the entrepreneur
and/or the start-up's substantive field, reduce uncertainty and
information asymmetry. 225 Conversely, the angel group's desire for a
more consistent deal flow means that fewer entrepreneurs and
business plans are known to the angel group members beforehand,
thereby sacrificing some of the familiarity and intimacy such
preexisting knowledge brings. 22 6 Higher levels of uncertainty and
information asymmetry are not reduced by the pre-investment nature
of the relationship, and therefore must be mitigated by contract.
Moreover, some angel groups may be less active participants in startup development post-investment than traditional angels. While it may
be rare, some angel groups actually hire outside parties to serve the
function of liaison between the angel group and the entrepreneur, 227 a
departure from the traditional angel investors' premium on
participation. 228 Fewer opportunities for informal monitoring create
the need for formal control rights to serve as a check on
entrepreneurial opportunism. It should be noted that angel groups
may forego participation at their own peril, as participation has been
229
correlated to greater returns on investment.

223. See supranote 117 and accompanying text.
224. On the other hand, some venture capitalists lament the nonfinancial "dinner club"
aspect of angel groups. See MIT Study, supra note 67, at 63 ("Some venture capitalists do not feel
that angel groups support their companies well. They characterized angel clubs as dinner clubs
in which members participated in due diligence, but did not sufficiently leverage their expertise
and networks in building the company after the investment had been made.").
225. See supra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
226. See Wilbank & Boeker, supra note 77, at 6 (finding that half of investments by angel
group members were unrelated to the angel's industry experience, which correlated to returns on
investments that were only half that of investments in the angel's field of expertise).
227. VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 45 ("In most cases, one member of the
syndicate acts as the lead angel, assuming a liaison role between the entrepreneur and the
syndicate. In other cases, an outsider with no financial commitment to the group.., is hired to
perform this function.") (citation omitted).
228. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
229. Wiltbank & Boeker, supra note 77, at 7.
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Third, angel group investments tend to be larger than
traditional angel investments, and there is potential for this trend to
increase given greater opportunities for the pooling of capital. Recall
that costly contracting theory made it irrational for traditional angels
to use detailed contracts given the smaller amounts of funding and
short duration for their preferences. 230 Because angel groups make
larger investments, and because venture capitalists are more willing
to allow angel group preferences to stand, costly contracting theory
becomes less of a reason to invest on simple terms. 23 1 Spending more
to design, monitor, enforce, and write detailed contracts becomes
worth the benefits it provides.
Finally, the nonfinancial perspective is also different for angel
groups. Angel groups may still be distinguished from venture
capitalists by their nonfinancial goals-angel group members are still
investing their own money-but these goals may be different than the
traditional angels' objectives. First, although some angel groups may
wish to participate in venture development, they may put less of a
premium on participation than traditional angels. Instead, the
primary nonfinancial motivation for many angel groups is the
opportunity to interact with other angels.
This is evident from both the candid admissions of angel group
members and the lack of investment activity by a large percentage of
them. Some angel groups have admitted that the "networking effect"
is an important motivator for group membership. For instance,
longtime traditional angel and now angel group member Susan
Preston notes that one "reason for the rise of angel groups, a reason
that is difficult to quantify ... [is] the simple desire for group
interaction and socialization." 232 In the view of Bob Goff, founder of
the Sierra Angels in Lake Tahoe, Nevada, "The central element of the
Sierra Angels' mantra is having fun," and spouses are an integral part
of that group's activities. 23 3 A telling statistic underscores the point:
thirty to forty percent of angels who join angel groups do not make a
single investment.234 This has led some groups to require a minimum

230. See supranotes 146-49 and accompanying text.
231. John May, co-founder of a Washington, D.C.-area angel group, suggests that costly
contracting theory plays a role in determining whether his angels bargain for a board seat. John
May, The Dinner Club: Embracing the New Economy, in STATE OF THE ART 120, supra note 43, at
127 ("When a board seat is inappropriate for the size of our investment, we often take on an
advisor role.").
232. Preston, supra note 209, at 68-69.
233. Goff, supra note 77, at 72.
234. Jeffrey E. Sohl, Angel Investing: A Market Perspective, in STATE OF THE ART 2, supra
note 43, at 12 ("In 2000 and 2001, indications were that 36 and 41 percent, respectively, of angel
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investment amount for membership. 23 5 In short, angel groups may
serve each other as much as they serve entrepreneurs.
Second, while angel groups may have altruistic objectives, their
altruism can take a different form than that of traditional angels.
Although giving back to the entrepreneurial community is still
important to angel groups, philanthropy also takes the form of
donations to nonprofit organizations and foundations through pooling
member resources. One angel group has even endowed a
professorship. 236 Angel groups also can further social goals, such as
enticing more women to become angel investors. This goal is
important to Seraph Capital Forum, an angel group in the Pacific
237
Northwest comprised entirely of female members.
These possible differences in nonfinancial goals are relevant to
the choice between simple or detailed contracts. Achieving the angel
group's nonfinancial goals is not as dependent on securing the trust of
entrepreneurs. Recall that traditional angels will not demand
protective contracts because of the ramifications for entrepreneurial
trust. 238 But for angel group members who are not driven primarily by
the desire for participation or altruism toward entrepreneurs, but
instead by other factors, there is less need to engender trust in

organization members did not make an investment. This compares with 32 percent of investors
in 1998.") (citation omitted).
235. See William H. Payne, Tech Coast Angels: An Alliance of Angel Networks, in STATE OF
THE ART 54, supra note 43, at 58 (explaining that Tech Coast Angels' members are required to
invest at least $50,000 each year); Sokoloff, supra note 200, at 46 (discussing the fact that
members of Tenex Medical Investors "were expected to invest at least $75,000 yearly (this has
been relaxed in the current economy)"). In addition, social networking can pay off financially in
other ways for some angel groups, who have been known to start businesses together outside of
the group. See Davis et al., supra note 216, at 161:
Not only have many of the members developed friendships but also several
have created new businesses together outside of [Angel Healthcare
Investors]. Two of the original members joined with two later members to
launch a specialty pharmaceuticals company that has the potential to
reshape the value chain of drugs coming off patent. One founding member
joined with a newer member to create a fund of hedge funds investing in nonhealth-care companies and offered the fund to members and other high-networth individuals.
236. See Davis et al., supra note 216, at 161 (finding that of Boston's Angel Healthcare
Investors, "[s]everal shared philanthropic interests have emerged since the group was
founded .... A recent example is the endowment of a charity at a well-known local university to
acknowledge the contributions to the school and to health care nationwide by a member of
AHI."); Barry Moltz, PrairieAngels: Redefining Midwest Investing, in STATE OF THE ART 108,
supra note 43, at 115 (reporting that Prairie Angels in Chicago has "donated money to a
nonprofit organization in town that trains inner-city youth to become familiar with Web sites
and expand their technical expertise").
237. Seraph Capital Forum, http://www.seraphcapital.com/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2008).
238. See supra Section III.C.2.b.
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V. CONCLUSION

Start-up companies have brought us some of the greatest
technological and scientific advances in recent years, as well as
significant job creation and economic prosperity. At the outset,
however, these companies are little more than an idea. The
entrepreneur's greatest challenge is obtaining the funding and advice
needed to turn her company into the next Google or eBay. As this
Article has explained, it is at this early stage that angel investors play
a critical and underappreciated role. Angels enable new start-ups to
develop by providing early financing and seasoned advice to
entrepreneurs. Angels invest at a critical time, after friends-andfamily money has run out but before venture capitalists will invest. In
doing so, they fill a funding gap that, left unremedied, would endanger
both start-up survival and the venture capital industry.
This Article has also examined angel investment contract
design, which appears very puzzling on its face. Traditional angels,
who still make the bulk of angel investments, use simple,
entrepreneur-friendly contracts despite the extreme risks that this
practice entails. The conventional wisdom is that they do so because
they are unsophisticated investors who don't know any better. But
this Article has explained that traditional angels are misunderstoodupon closer examination, their investment contracts are rationally
designed to achieve financial and nonfinancial objectives.
Finally, this Article examined the recent trend toward the
professionalization of angel investing. Although more information is
needed to understand this phenomenon, one of its consequences is
that professional angels are increasingly adopting venture capital
contract design. In doing so, they are instituting a major change in
angel investing, albeit one that is rational given their closer
resemblance to early-stage venture capitalists than to traditional
angels.

The Effects Test:
Extraterritoriality'sFifth Business
61 Vand. L. Rev. 1455 (2008)
Austen L. Parrish
American laws increasingly regulate the conduct of foreigners
abroad. The growth in extraterritoriallaws, in no small part, can be
traced to the effects test-a doctrine that instructs courts to presume
that Congress intended to regulate extraterritorially when foreign
conduct is found to have a substantial effect within the United
States. For many scholars and lawyers, the effects test is the
doctrinal linchpin for determining the geographic reach of domestic
laws. Territoriallimits on legislativejurisdiction,on the other hand,
are seen as anachronistic;a remnant of a pre-modern, pre-globalized
world.
This Article takes a more skeptical view of the effects test. The
Article argues that many scholars have failed to appreciate the
effects test's shortcomings, and the problems that extraterritorial
laws create. Rather than place meaningful limits on legislative
jurisdiction, the effects test has created confusion and inconsistency,
while dramatically increasing the number of laws applied
extraterritorially.Contrary to conventional wisdom, courts would be
wise to reembrace territorial limits to legislative jurisdiction.
Domestic laws that regulate extraterritorially undermine
international harmony, are inherently undemocratic, and threaten
long-term American interests. In a globalized world, where
territorialborders play a less important role, territoriallimits have
become ever more important as a necessary constraint to legislative
action and a way to protect American interests. The Article
concludes that the effects test is best understood as a narrow limit
on Congressionalpower, not as a doctrinal command that reverses
the presumption against extraterritoriality.

